Cooperation is not rewarded by friendship, but generous and selfish students repel each other in social networks
PLOS One · 2025
DOI: 10.1371/journal.pone.0326564 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift PLOS One, 2025. Verfasst von Flóra Samu und 4 weiteren Autor:innen. Beteiligte Einrichtung: CSS-RECENS, HUN-REN Centre for Social Sciences, Budapest, Hungary. Hauptthemen laut MEDLINE: Cooperative Behavior, Friends, Students, Social Networking. Die Arbeit nennt 106 Literaturangaben. Der Volltext ist frei zugänglich (Open Access, CC BY 4.0). Gefördert von: Emilia Romagna Region, “Information and education to sustainability", University of Venice, Decentralized Platform Economics: Optimal Incentives and Structure, Nemzeti Kutatási, Fejlesztési és Innovaciós Alap.
Abstract (Originalsprache)
Humans cooperate across various contexts, despite the individual costs involved. Cooperation and prosocial behavior may persist because these costs are offset by reputation and other social benefits. Specifically, cooperators and prosocial individuals may receive more friendship nominations and be less likely to face exclusion or avoidance. We test whether such beneficial network dynamics are present in a unique dataset of twenty primary school classes in northern Italy. Cooperation and social preferences of 420 students in grades 4 and 5 were measured with incentivized social dilemma games, and the social network of the entire classroom was traced on two subsequent occasions. We modeled the dynamics of friendship and negative ties with Stochastic Actor-Oriented Models, and conducted a meta-analysis of the results. Our key finding is that, while we do not observe evidence of homophily based on social preferences in friendship nominations - and being prosocial does not lead to receiving more friendship nominations, individuals are significantly more likely to direct negative tie nominations toward peers who made different offers in the dictator game. These results suggest that social network dynamics support cooperation not by rewarding prosocial behavior with friendship, but through repulsion between prosocial and selfish students.
Schlagwörter
MeSH-Schlagwörter (MEDLINE)
Autor:innen und Institutionen
- CSS-RECENS, HUN-REN Centre for Social Sciences, Budapest, Hungary.
- Social, Economic and Geographical Sciences, The James Hutton Institute, Aberdeen, Scotland, United Kingdom.
- Department of Economics 'Marco Biagi', University of Modena and Reggio Emilia, Modena, Italy.
- Department of Agricultural and Food Sciences, University of Bologna, Bologna, Italy.
- Institute for Analytical Sociology, Department of Management and Engineering, Linköping University, Norrköping, Sweden.
ORCID-Profile: Simone Piras, Simone Righi, Károly Takács
Förderung
- Emilia Romagna Region, “Information and education to sustainability"
- University of Venice, Decentralized Platform Economics: Optimal Incentives and Structure
- Nemzeti Kutatási, Fejlesztési és Innovaciós Alap
- Vetenskapsrådet
Zitieren
APA
Samu, F., Piras, S., Righi, S., Setti, M., & Takács, K. (2025). Cooperation is not rewarded by friendship, but generous and selfish students repel each other in social networks. PLOS One. https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0326564
Vancouver
Samu F, Piras S, Righi S, Setti M, Takács K. Cooperation is not rewarded by friendship, but generous and selfish students repel each other in social networks. PLOS One. 2025. doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0326564
BibTeX
@article{Samu2025,
author = {Samu, Flóra and Piras, Simone and Righi, Simone and Setti, Marco and Takács, Károly},
title = {Cooperation is not rewarded by friendship, but generous and selfish students repel each other in social networks},
journal = {PLOS One},
year = {2025},
doi = {10.1371/journal.pone.0326564}
}
EUVIMED