Analysis of government subsidy strategies in the supply chain of science and technology innovation platform
PLOS One · 2025
DOI: 10.1371/journal.pone.0323627 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift PLOS One, 2025. Verfasst von Guangsi Zhang und 3 weiteren Autor:innen. Beteiligte Einrichtung: School of Business Administration, Xinjiang University of Finance and Economics, Urumqi, China. Hauptthemen laut MEDLINE: Financing, Government, Inventions, Technology, Science. Die Arbeit nennt 34 Literaturangaben. Der Volltext ist frei zugänglich (Open Access, CC BY 4.0). Gefördert von: the Natural Science Foundation of Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region, the Humanities and Social Sciences Youth Foundation of Ministry of Education of China, the Major Projects of the National Social Science Foundation of China.
Abstract (Originalsprache)
In the current era of technological advancements and intense global competition, innovation in Science and Technology (S&T) has become a crucial aspect of every country’s development strategy, and the development of cutting-edge technologies in core areas is of utmost importance. Innovation platforms that offer services for core technologies can be classified into three operational models: Public Welfare Platforms, Social Enterprise Platforms, and Commercial Platforms, depending on their objectives. To accelerate the realization of S&T innovation, the government provides subsidies to guide the S&T innovation platform and increase the participation of innovation subjects. With the help of optimization theory and supply chain theory, this paper constructed a model employing the game approach to delve into the pricing strategies of S&T platforms under three distinct models: Public Welfare Platform, Social Enterprise Platform, and Commercial Platform. The paper also discusses the effects of government subsidies on different innovation subjects. The study demonstrates that all three operational models can achieve the optimal membership fee for research users and the optimal commission rebate paid by the platform to resource providers. In the context of the Public Welfare Platform, despite the highest social welfare, the platform’s profit remains negative. Consequently, price subsidies are required for research users. At this juncture, the government subsidies to the S&T innovation platform yield the greatest social welfare yet the lowest profit for the platform. In contrast, the Social Enterprise Platform entails government subsidies for resource providers and research users, which can enhance the platform’s profit. The effect of subsidizing the resource providers on the profit growth of the S&T innovation platform is more significant than the effect on the improvement of social welfare. In the context of the Commercial Platform, regardless of the existence of government subsidies, the growth of social welfare and platform profits with the platform service level can be achieved. Furthermore, government subsidies for scientific research users are the most effective. These results provide theoretical and practical lessons for the pricing of the S&T innovation platform and the subject of government subsidies.
Schlagwörter
MeSH-Schlagwörter (MEDLINE)
Autor:innen und Institutionen
- School of Business Administration, Xinjiang University of Finance and Economics, Urumqi, China.
- College of Business, Shanghai University of Finance and Economics, Shanghai, China.
- Hebei University of Water Resources and Electric Engineering, Cangzhou, China.
- Digital Intelligence Management Research Institute, Shanghai University of Finance and Economics Zhejiang College, Jinhua, China.
ORCID-Profile: Qiang Hu
Förderung
- the Natural Science Foundation of Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region
- the Humanities and Social Sciences Youth Foundation of Ministry of Education of China
- the Major Projects of the National Social Science Foundation of China
- the National Social Science Fund of China
- the Philosophy and Social Science Planning Project of Zhejiang Province of China
- the Development Foundation of Shanghai University of Finance and Economics Zhejiang College
Zitieren
APA
Zhang, G., Chen, C., Xie, J., & Hu, Q. (2025). Analysis of government subsidy strategies in the supply chain of science and technology innovation platform. PLOS One. https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0323627
Vancouver
Zhang G, Chen C, Xie J, Hu Q. Analysis of government subsidy strategies in the supply chain of science and technology innovation platform. PLOS One. 2025. doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0323627
BibTeX
@article{Zhang2025,
author = {Zhang, Guangsi and Chen, Chen and Xie, Jiaping and Hu, Qiang},
title = {Analysis of government subsidy strategies in the supply chain of science and technology innovation platform},
journal = {PLOS One},
year = {2025},
doi = {10.1371/journal.pone.0323627}
}
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