How do inside directors affect corporate R&D investment? The moderating role of CEO equity incentives
PLOS ONE · 2025
DOI: 10.1371/journal.pone.0317123 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift PLOS ONE, 2025. Verfasst von Jianqing Zhou und 1 weiteren Autor:innen. Beteiligte Einrichtung: School of Finance and Economics, Guangdong Polytechnic Normal University, Guangzhou, China. Hauptthemen laut MEDLINE: Investments, Motivation, Research. Die Arbeit nennt 75 Literaturangaben. Der Volltext ist frei zugänglich (Open Access, CC BY 4.0). Gefördert von: Guangdong Office of Philosophy and Social Science, Humanities and Social Science Fund of Ministry of Education of China, Key Research Base of Humanities and Social Sciences in Universities of Guangdong Province.
Abstract (Originalsprache)
This study aims to reveal whether non-CEO inside directors can promote corporate research and development (R&D) investment. Using a panel data of 3,002 Chinese manufacturing listed firms from 2011 to 2021, we find that inside directors can significantly promote corporate R&D investment. We also find that when the CEO has equity incentives to alleviate agency conflicts, the role of inside directors in promoting R&D investment is significantly weakened. Additional analysis show that the promotive effect of inside directors on R&D investment is significant only in samples of non-state-owned enterprises (non-SOEs), male CEOs, older CEOs, and small boards, but not for the samples of state-owned enterprises (SOEs), female CEOs, younger CEOs, and large boards. These findings extend the scope of research on the economic consequences of inside directors and have important implications for the optimization and adjustment of corporate governance policies.
Schlagwörter
MeSH-Schlagwörter (MEDLINE)
Autor:innen und Institutionen
- School of Finance and Economics, Guangdong Polytechnic Normal University, Guangzhou, China.
- College of Management, Guangzhou City University of Technology, Guangzhou , China.
- Guangdong Education Big Data Research Center, Guangdong University of Technology, Guangzhou , China.
ORCID-Profile: Jianqing Zhou, Yulian Peng
Förderung
- Guangdong Office of Philosophy and Social Science
- Humanities and Social Science Fund of Ministry of Education of China
- Key Research Base of Humanities and Social Sciences in Universities of Guangdong Province
- Soft Science Research Project of Guangdong Province
Zitieren
APA
Zhou, J., & Peng, Y. (2025). How do inside directors affect corporate R&D investment? The moderating role of CEO equity incentives. PLOS ONE. https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0317123
Vancouver
Zhou J, Peng Y. How do inside directors affect corporate R&D investment? The moderating role of CEO equity incentives. PLOS ONE. 2025. doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0317123
BibTeX
@article{Zhou2025,
author = {Zhou, Jianqing and Peng, Yulian},
title = {How do inside directors affect corporate R&D investment? The moderating role of CEO equity incentives},
journal = {PLOS ONE},
year = {2025},
doi = {10.1371/journal.pone.0317123}
}
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