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Open Access · CC BY 4.0

A certificateless aggregate signature scheme for VANETs with privacy protection properties

Huimin Li, Chucheng Shen, Hui Huang, Chenhuang Wu iD

PLOS ONE · 2025

DOI: 10.1371/journal.pone.0317047 ↗

Kurz gefasst

Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift PLOS ONE, 2025. Verfasst von Huimin Li und 3 weiteren Autor:innen. Beteiligte Einrichtung: Fujian Key Laboratory of Financial Information Processing, Putian University, Fujian, Putian, China. Hauptthemen laut MEDLINE: Computer Security, Computer Communication Networks, Privacy. Die Arbeit wurde bisher 8-mal zitiert (Crossref) und nennt 43 Literaturangaben. Der Volltext ist frei zugänglich (Open Access, CC BY 4.0). Gefördert von: Innovative Research Group Project of the National Natural Science Foundation of China, the Key Technological Innovation and Industrialization Projects in Fujian Province, the Natural Science Foundation of Fujian Province of China.

AbstractSchlagwörterBibliografische AngabenZitierenVerwandte Studien

Abstract (Originalsprache)

Aggregate signatures are excellent in simultaneously verifying the validity of multiple signatures, which renders them highly suitable for bandwidth-constrained environments. The certificateless public key system is among the most advanced public key cryptosystems at present. Scholars have combined their advantages to develop certificateless aggregate signature schemes, which are applicable to the secure communication of Vehicular Ad-hoc Networks (VANETs). Recently, Cahyadi E F et al. put forward a certificateless aggregate signature scheme specifically designed for use in VANETs. Regrettably, through our strict security analysis, we discovered at least two major vulnerabilities in the signature scheme: a public key replacement attack and a malicious KGC (Key Generation Center) attack. To tackle these vulnerabilities, our article not only presents the methods of these attacks but also explores the fundamental reasons for their feasibility. Additionally, we propose specific improvement measures and show that the enhanced scheme retains its security under the random oracle model. The stability of the improved scheme depends on the computational complexity of the Diffie-Hellman problem. Finally, a comprehensive assessment involving security, computational cost, communicational cost, and calculational efficiency overhead highlights the excellent performance of our proposed solution.

Schlagwörter

MeSH-Schlagwörter (MEDLINE)

Computer SecurityComputer Communication NetworksPrivacyAlgorithmsHumans

Autor:innen und Institutionen

  • Fujian Key Laboratory of Financial Information Processing, Putian University, Fujian, Putian, China.
  • Key Laboratory of Financial Mathematics of Fujian Province University, Putian University, Fujian, Putian, China.
  • Fujian ZhongXin Network Security Information Technology Company Limited, Fujian, Fuzhou, China.
  • School of Computer Science, Minnan Normal University, Fujian, Zhangzhou, China.

ORCID-Profile: Chenhuang Wu

Förderung

  • Innovative Research Group Project of the National Natural Science Foundation of China
  • the Key Technological Innovation and Industrialization Projects in Fujian Province
  • the Natural Science Foundation of Fujian Province of China
  • Open Research Fund of Fujian Key Laboratory of Financial Information Processing at Putian University of China
  • the Science and Technology Project of Putian City of China

Zitieren

APA

Li, H., Shen, C., Huang, H., & Wu, C. (2025). A certificateless aggregate signature scheme for VANETs with privacy protection properties. PLOS ONE. https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0317047

Vancouver

Li H, Shen C, Huang H, Wu C. A certificateless aggregate signature scheme for VANETs with privacy protection properties. PLOS ONE. 2025. doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0317047

BibTeX
@article{Li2025,
  author = {Li, Huimin and Shen, Chucheng and Huang, Hui and Wu, Chenhuang},
  title = {A certificateless aggregate signature scheme for VANETs with privacy protection properties},
  journal = {PLOS ONE},
  year = {2025},
  doi = {10.1371/journal.pone.0317047}
}
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