Coordinating principal–agent and incentive strategy of cold chain logistics service in fresh food supply chain
PLOS ONE · 2024
DOI: 10.1371/journal.pone.0306976 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift PLOS ONE, 2024. Verfasst von Ming Zeng und 4 weiteren Autor:innen. Beteiligte Einrichtung: College of Management Science, Chengdu University of Technology, Chengdu, People's Republic of China. Hauptthemen laut MEDLINE: Food Supply. Die Arbeit wurde bisher 6-mal zitiert (Crossref) und nennt 54 Literaturangaben. Der Volltext ist frei zugänglich (Open Access, CC BY 4.0). Gefördert von: Humanities and Social Sciences Research Fund of Ministry of Education, Philosophy and Social Science Research Fund of Chengdu University of Technology, National Natural Science Foundation of China.
Abstract (Originalsprache)
With the increasing production and circulation of fresh food, society’s requirements for product quality have also increased. Currently, upstream and downstream enterprises in the fresh food supply chain tend to delegate the cold chain transportation of fresh food to third–party cold chain logistics (CCL) service providers who offer more professional integrated preservation services. This study adopts coordination theory to research the delegation, coordination, and incentive strategies between a Fresh Food Producer, Distributor, and CCL Service Provider. The aim is to promote the efforts of the CCL Service Provider in improving freshness and achieving the overall optimal interests of the fresh food supply chain. First, the basic models of the Fresh Food Producer and Distributor individually entrusting the CCL Service Provider are established under different information conditions. Second, a collaborative delegation agency model between the Fresh Food Producer and Distributor is established on top of the basic models. Finally, through the optimal decision solutions under different information conditions and numerical calculations of preservation benefit levels, the following conclusions are drawn: (1) The more transparent and open the information environment, the more it can encourage the CCL Service Provider to improve the quality of their preservation services, allowing the Fresh Food Producer and Distributor to obtain more significant preservation benefits. However, when information is completely transparent, the incentive mechanisms formulated by the Fresh Food Producer and Distributor become ineffective. (2) Collaborative cooperation strategies can encourage the CCL Service Provider to enhance their preservation efforts while strengthening the effectiveness of relevant incentive strategies for the Fresh Food Producer and Distributor.
Schlagwörter
MeSH-Schlagwörter (MEDLINE)
Autor:innen und Institutionen
- College of Management Science, Chengdu University of Technology, Chengdu, People's Republic of China.
ORCID-Profile: Yuxiang Wu
Förderung
- Humanities and Social Sciences Research Fund of Ministry of Education
- Philosophy and Social Science Research Fund of Chengdu University of Technology
- National Natural Science Foundation of China
Zitieren
APA
Zeng, M., Wu, Y., Xing, X., Tang, W., & Xu, H. (2024). Coordinating principal–agent and incentive strategy of cold chain logistics service in fresh food supply chain. PLOS ONE. https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0306976
Vancouver
Zeng M, Wu Y, Xing X, Tang W, Xu H. Coordinating principal–agent and incentive strategy of cold chain logistics service in fresh food supply chain. PLOS ONE. 2024. doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0306976
BibTeX
@article{Zeng2024,
author = {Zeng, Ming and Wu, Yuxiang and Xing, Xiaoling and Tang, Wenjing and Xu, Huyang},
title = {Coordinating principal–agent and incentive strategy of cold chain logistics service in fresh food supply chain},
journal = {PLOS ONE},
year = {2024},
doi = {10.1371/journal.pone.0306976}
}
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