Recognising and evaluating the effectiveness of extortion in the Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma
PLOS ONE · 2024
DOI: 10.1371/journal.pone.0304641 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift PLOS ONE, 2024. Verfasst von Vincent Knight und 3 weiteren Autor:innen. Beteiligte Einrichtung: School of Mathematics, Cardiff University, Cardiff, United Kingdom. Hauptthemen laut MEDLINE: Prisoner Dilemma, Game Theory, Cooperative Behavior. Die Arbeit wurde bisher 3-mal zitiert (Crossref) und nennt 37 Literaturangaben. Der Volltext ist frei zugänglich (Open Access, CC BY 4.0).
Abstract (Originalsprache)
Establishing and maintaining mutual cooperation in agent-to-agent interactions can be viewed as a question of direct reciprocity and readily applied to the Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma. Agents cooperate, at a small cost to themselves, in the hope of obtaining a future benefit. Zero-determinant strategies, introduced in 2012, have a subclass of strategies that are provably extortionate. In the established literature, most of the studies of the effectiveness or lack thereof, of zero-determinant strategies is done by placing some zero-determinant strategy in a specific scenario (collection of agents) and evaluating its performance either numerically or theoretically. Extortionate strategies are algebraically rigid and memory-one by definition, and requires complete knowledge of a strategy (the memory-one cooperation probabilities). The contribution of this work is a method to detect extortionate behaviour from the history of play of an arbitrary strategy. This inverts the paradigm of most studies: instead of observing the effectiveness of some theoretically extortionate strategies, the largest known collection of strategies will be observed and their intensity of extortion quantified empirically. Moreover, we show that the lack of adaptability of extortionate strategies extends via this broader definition.
Schlagwörter
MeSH-Schlagwörter (MEDLINE)
Autor:innen und Institutionen
- School of Mathematics, Cardiff University, Cardiff, United Kingdom.
- Google Inc., Mountain View, CA, United States of America.
- Max Planck Research Group on the Dynamics of Social Behavior, Max Planck Institute for Evolutionary Biology, Plön, Germany.
ORCID-Profile: Vincent Knight
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APA
Knight, V., Harper, M., Glynatsi, N. E., & Gillard, J. (2024). Recognising and evaluating the effectiveness of extortion in the Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma. PLOS ONE. https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0304641
Vancouver
Knight V, Harper M, Glynatsi NE, Gillard J. Recognising and evaluating the effectiveness of extortion in the Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma. PLOS ONE. 2024. doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0304641
BibTeX
@article{Knight2024,
author = {Knight, Vincent and Harper, Marc and Glynatsi, Nikoleta E and Gillard, Jonathan},
title = {Recognising and evaluating the effectiveness of extortion in the Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma},
journal = {PLOS ONE},
year = {2024},
doi = {10.1371/journal.pone.0304641}
}
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