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Open Access · CC BY 4.0

Effectivenes of incentive constraint policies in enhancing green bond credit rating and certification: A theoretical and empirical study

Hanyi Zhao iD, Yixiang Tian, Xiangyun Zhou, Xuefeng Zhao

PLOS ONE · 2023

DOI: 10.1371/journal.pone.0289750 ↗

Kurz gefasst

Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift PLOS ONE, 2023. Verfasst von Hanyi Zhao und 3 weiteren Autor:innen. Beteiligte Einrichtung: School of Management and Economics, University of Electronic Science and Technology of China, Chengdu, Sichuan, China. Hauptthemen laut MEDLINE: Motivation, Fiscal Policy. Die Arbeit wurde bisher 5-mal zitiert (Crossref) und nennt 38 Literaturangaben. Der Volltext ist frei zugänglich (Open Access, CC BY 4.0). Gefördert von: Shenzhen Education Science 2022 Annual Planning Project, Major Projects of Guangdong Education Department for Foundation Research and Applied Research, National Nature Science Foundation of China.

AbstractSchlagwörterBibliografische AngabenZitierenVerwandte Studien

Abstract (Originalsprache)

This paper aims to effectively reduce CO2 emissions by examining the impact of three distinct incentive and constraint policies on the quality of rating and certification information in China’s green bond issuance market. To accomplish this, the government has implemented incentives, while regulators have introduced constraints to curb the spread of inflated rating and certification information. We build on the integrated rating and certification regulation mechanism by presenting a two-stage Stackelberg game model that involves four key participants: the China Securities Regulatory Commission, local governments, green evaluation and certification agencies, and credit rating agencies. We incorporate environmental effects indicators into the expected utility of rating and certification agencies to investigate the equilibrium conditions under three policy scenarios: a single financial incentive policy, a single regulatory constraint policy, and a combined incentive and constraint policy. The paper employs Stackelberg game theory to analyze how different policies mitigate the occurrence of “inflated” ratings and “greenwashing” in certifications. Numerical analysis is conducted to validate the theoretical findings. Moreover, we assess the impact of these policies on the quality of rating and evaluation information, using data from China’s green bond issuance market between 2016 and 2021. Our research offers valuable management insights and regulatory recommendations for both regulators and local governments.

Schlagwörter

MeSH-Schlagwörter (MEDLINE)

MotivationFiscal PolicyHumansPolicyCertificationChinaLocal Government

Autor:innen und Institutionen

  • School of Management and Economics, University of Electronic Science and Technology of China, Chengdu, Sichuan, China.
  • Shenzhen Institute of Information Technology, Shenzhen, Guangdong, China.
  • Jiangsu Ocean University, Lianyungang, Jiangsu, China.

ORCID-Profile: Hanyi Zhao

Förderung

  • Shenzhen Education Science 2022 Annual Planning Project
  • Major Projects of Guangdong Education Department for Foundation Research and Applied Research
  • National Nature Science Foundation of China

Zitieren

APA

Zhao, H., Tian, Y., Zhou, X., & Zhao, X. (2023). Effectivenes of incentive constraint policies in enhancing green bond credit rating and certification: A theoretical and empirical study. PLOS ONE. https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0289750

Vancouver

Zhao H, Tian Y, Zhou X, Zhao X. Effectivenes of incentive constraint policies in enhancing green bond credit rating and certification: A theoretical and empirical study. PLOS ONE. 2023. doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0289750

BibTeX
@article{Zhao2023,
  author = {Zhao, Hanyi and Tian, Yixiang and Zhou, Xiangyun and Zhao, Xuefeng},
  title = {Effectivenes of incentive constraint policies in enhancing green bond credit rating and certification: A theoretical and empirical study},
  journal = {PLOS ONE},
  year = {2023},
  doi = {10.1371/journal.pone.0289750}
}
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