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Open Access · CC BY 4.0

Optimal government and manufacturer incentive contracts for green production with asymmetric information

Jiayang Xu iD, Jian Cao, Sanjay Kumar, Sisi Wu

PLOS ONE · 2023

DOI: 10.1371/journal.pone.0289639 ↗

Kurz gefasst

Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift PLOS ONE, 2023. Verfasst von Jiayang Xu und 3 weiteren Autor:innen. Beteiligte Einrichtung: School of Economics and Management, Zhejiang University of Science and Technology, Hangzhou, Zhejiang Province, China. Hauptthemen laut MEDLINE: Motivation, Non-alcoholic Fatty Liver Disease. Die Arbeit wurde bisher 4-mal zitiert (Crossref) und nennt 78 Literaturangaben. Der Volltext ist frei zugänglich (Open Access, CC BY 4.0). Gefördert von: Humanities and Social Sciences Youth Foundation of Ministry of Education of China, National Natural Science Foundation of China, State Key Program of National Social Science Fund of China.

AbstractSchlagwörterBibliografische AngabenZitierenVerwandte Studien

Abstract (Originalsprache)

Governments commonly utilize subsidy policy to incentivize manufacturers to produce green products, promoting sustainable development. However, in the presence of information asymmetry, some manufacturers may dishonestly misrepresent the green degree of their products to secure higher subsidies. This study examines different incentive contracts between the government and a green product manufacturer who keeps private information of a product’s green-degree in a principal-agent model. Lump-sum transfer and fixed- and flexible-proportion benefit-sharing contracts are proposed to investigate screening and improving green-degree issues. To further enhance the flexible-proportion benefit-sharing contract, we construct a non-linear coordinated contract based on the Nash bargaining solution. The revelation principle and Nash bargaining are performed for comparison and analysis of the contracts. We find that the lump-sum contract reveals true green-degree information but fails to impel manufacturers to improve product’s green-degree in developing countries where green product development is in initial stages. In contrast, both fixed- and flexible- proportion benefit-sharing contracts are effective in reveling and enhancing green-degree. The non-linear coordination contract optimizes resource allocation and achieves Pareto improvement. An applied case study for inkjet printer operations and numerical experiments corroborate our model findings.

Schlagwörter

MeSH-Schlagwörter (MEDLINE)

MotivationNon-alcoholic Fatty Liver DiseaseHumansContractsNegotiatingGovernmentCommerce

Autor:innen und Institutionen

  • School of Economics and Management, Zhejiang University of Science and Technology, Hangzhou, Zhejiang Province, China.
  • School of Management, Zhejiang University of Technology, Hangzhou, Zhejiang Province, China.
  • Center for Global & Regional Environmental Research, The University of Iowa, Iowa City, Iowa, United States of America.
  • College of Business, Valparaiso University, Valparaiso, Indiana, United States of America.

ORCID-Profile: Jiayang Xu

Förderung

  • Humanities and Social Sciences Youth Foundation of Ministry of Education of China
  • National Natural Science Foundation of China
  • State Key Program of National Social Science Fund of China
  • Zhejiang Office of Philosophy and Social Science

Zitieren

APA

Xu, J., Cao, J., Kumar, S., & Wu, S. (2023). Optimal government and manufacturer incentive contracts for green production with asymmetric information. PLOS ONE. https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0289639

Vancouver

Xu J, Cao J, Kumar S, Wu S. Optimal government and manufacturer incentive contracts for green production with asymmetric information. PLOS ONE. 2023. doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0289639

BibTeX
@article{Xu2023,
  author = {Xu, Jiayang and Cao, Jian and Kumar, Sanjay and Wu, Sisi},
  title = {Optimal government and manufacturer incentive contracts for green production with asymmetric information},
  journal = {PLOS ONE},
  year = {2023},
  doi = {10.1371/journal.pone.0289639}
}
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