Does controlling shareholders’ share pledge exacerbate excessive financialization of enterprises?—Evidence from performance pressure perspective
PLOS ONE · 19.07.2023 · 18 (7) · e0288705
DOI: 10.1371/journal.pone.0288705 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift PLOS ONE, online erschienen am 19.07.2023. Verfasst von Yue Xie und 3 weiteren Autor:innen. Beteiligte Einrichtung: School of Economics, Zhejiang University of Technology, Hangzhou, China. Hauptthemen laut MEDLINE: Industry, Myopia. Die Arbeit wurde bisher 15-mal zitiert (Crossref) und nennt 47 Literaturangaben. Der Volltext ist frei zugänglich (Open Access, CC BY 4.0). Gefördert von: National Natural Science Foundation of China, National Social Science Fund of China.
Abstract (Originalsprache)
Based on the perspective of performance pressure, we explore the influence of controlling shareholders’ share pledge on excessive financialization behavior of enterprises and its internal mechanism. The results show that the share pledge of controlling shareholders is positively correlated with the excessive financialization behavior of enterprises. After the controlling shareholder’s share pledge, the actual performance of the enterprise is lower than expected, causing the short-sighted behavior of the management, which makes the management willing to conspire with the controlling shareholder to cause the excessive financialization of the enterprise. The results are especially evident among the uncertainty of economic policy is low, the industry competition is not fierce and the executives have overseas experience.
Schlagwörter
MeSH-Schlagwörter (MEDLINE)
Autor:innen und Institutionen
- School of Economics, Zhejiang University of Technology, Hangzhou, China.
ORCID-Profile: Tianhui Wang
Förderung
- National Natural Science Foundation of China
- National Social Science Fund of China
Zitieren
APA
Xie, Y., Wang, T., Zhang, J., & Wang, N. (2023). Does controlling shareholders’ share pledge exacerbate excessive financialization of enterprises?—Evidence from performance pressure perspective. PLOS ONE, 18(7), e0288705. https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0288705
Vancouver
Xie Y, Wang T, Zhang J, Wang N. Does controlling shareholders’ share pledge exacerbate excessive financialization of enterprises?—Evidence from performance pressure perspective. PLOS ONE. 2023;18(7):e0288705. doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0288705
BibTeX
@article{Xie2023,
author = {Xie, Yue and Wang, Tianhui and Zhang, Jinhua and Wang, Na},
title = {Does controlling shareholders’ share pledge exacerbate excessive financialization of enterprises?—Evidence from performance pressure perspective},
journal = {PLOS ONE},
year = {2023},
volume = {18},
number = {7},
pages = {e0288705},
doi = {10.1371/journal.pone.0288705}
}
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