A traveler-centric mobility game: Efficiency and stability under rationality and prospect theory
PLOS ONE · 2023
DOI: 10.1371/journal.pone.0285322 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift PLOS ONE, 2023. Verfasst von Ioannis Vasileios Chremos und 1 weiteren Autor:innen. Beteiligte Einrichtung: Department of Mechanical Engineering, University of Delaware, Newark, Delaware, United States of America. Hauptthemen laut MEDLINE: Travel, Transportation. Die Arbeit wurde bisher 4-mal zitiert (Crossref) und nennt 95 Literaturangaben. Der Volltext ist frei zugänglich (Open Access, CC BY 4.0). Gefördert von: National Science Foundation.
Themen: Mobilisation
Abstract (Originalsprache)
In this paper, we study a routing and travel-mode choice problem for mobility systems with a multimodal transportation network as a “mobility game” with coupled action sets. We formulate an atomic routing game to focus on the travelers’ preferences and study the impact on the efficiency of the travelers’ behavioral decision-making under rationality and prospect theory. To control the innate inefficiencies, we introduce a mobility “pricing mechanism,” in which we model traffic congestion using linear cost functions while also considering the waiting times at different transport hubs. We show that the travelers’ selfish actions lead to a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium. We then perform a Price of Anarchy and Price of Stability analysis to establish that the mobility system’s inefficiencies remain relatively low and the social welfare at a NE remains close to the social optimum as the number of travelers increases. We deviate from the standard game-theoretic analysis of decision-making by extending our mobility game to capture the subjective behavior of travelers using prospect theory. Finally, we provide a detailed discussion of implementing our proposed mobility game.
Schlagwörter
MeSH-Schlagwörter (MEDLINE)
Autor:innen und Institutionen
- Department of Mechanical Engineering, University of Delaware, Newark, Delaware, United States of America.
ORCID-Profile: Ioannis Vasileios Chremos
Förderung
- National Science Foundation
Zitieren
APA
Chremos, I. V., & Malikopoulos, A. A. (2023). A traveler-centric mobility game: Efficiency and stability under rationality and prospect theory. PLOS ONE. https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0285322
Vancouver
Chremos IV, Malikopoulos AA. A traveler-centric mobility game: Efficiency and stability under rationality and prospect theory. PLOS ONE. 2023. doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0285322
BibTeX
@article{Chremos2023,
author = {Chremos, Ioannis Vasileios and Malikopoulos, Andreas A},
title = {A traveler-centric mobility game: Efficiency and stability under rationality and prospect theory},
journal = {PLOS ONE},
year = {2023},
doi = {10.1371/journal.pone.0285322}
}
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