Governance of non-state-owned shareholders and corporate capital structure decision: A mechanism test from the opportunistic behavior of management
PLOS ONE · 2023
DOI: 10.1371/journal.pone.0281120 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift PLOS ONE, 2023. Verfasst von Jiao Wang und 3 weiteren Autor:innen. Beteiligte Einrichtung: School of Economics, Guangzhou College of Commerce, Guangzhou, P. R. China. Hauptthemen laut MEDLINE: Investments, Organizations. Die Arbeit wurde bisher 7-mal zitiert (Crossref) und nennt 35 Literaturangaben. Der Volltext ist frei zugänglich (Open Access, CC BY 4.0). Gefördert von: the Guangzhou College of Commerce 2021 Quality Engineering Project, the National Natural Science Foundation of China, the Major Program of the National Social Science Foundation of China.
Abstract (Originalsprache)
It is an important measure in the reform of state-owned enterprises to improve the efficiency of capital operation by introducing non-state-owned shareholders. This paper explores the impact of non-state shareholder governance on capital structure decision-making by using the data of 2008–2021 A-share state-owned listed companies from the perspective of the speed and deviation of capital structure adjustment. The results reveal that only non-state shareholding has no significant impact on the capital structure adjustment of a company. However, the appointment of senior management by non-state shareholders can speed up the capital structure adjustment and lower the degree of capital structure deviation. Moreover, when the capital structure goes down, the appointment of non-state-owned shareholders plays a larger role in accelerating the capital structure adjustment, which makes the deviation from the actual capital structure and the target capital structure smaller. Further research shows that the above relationship between non-state shareholder governance and the optimization and adjustment of the capital structure only exists in local SOEs and competitive SOEs. In addition, the path test found that non-state shareholder governance affects the dynamic adjustment of capital structure by reducing opportunism behavior of management rather than by financing constraints.
Schlagwörter
MeSH-Schlagwörter (MEDLINE)
Autor:innen und Institutionen
- School of Economics, Guangzhou College of Commerce, Guangzhou, P. R. China.
- School of Finance, Jiangxi Normal University, Nanchang, P. R. China.
ORCID-Profile: Shulin Xu
Förderung
- the Guangzhou College of Commerce 2021 Quality Engineering Project
- the National Natural Science Foundation of China
- the Major Program of the National Social Science Foundation of China
Zitieren
APA
Wang, J., Hu, Y., Liao, F., & Xu, S. (2023). Governance of non-state-owned shareholders and corporate capital structure decision: A mechanism test from the opportunistic behavior of management. PLOS ONE. https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0281120
Vancouver
Wang J, Hu Y, Liao F, Xu S. Governance of non-state-owned shareholders and corporate capital structure decision: A mechanism test from the opportunistic behavior of management. PLOS ONE. 2023. doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0281120
BibTeX
@article{Wang2023,
author = {Wang, Jiao and Hu, Yaoyao and Liao, Feimei and Xu, Shulin},
title = {Governance of non-state-owned shareholders and corporate capital structure decision: A mechanism test from the opportunistic behavior of management},
journal = {PLOS ONE},
year = {2023},
doi = {10.1371/journal.pone.0281120}
}
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