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Open Access · CC BY 4.0

Coevolutionary dynamics of cooperation, risk, and cost in collective risk games

Lichen Wang, Shijia Hua, Yuyuan Liu iD, Liang Zhang, Linjie Liu iD, Attila Szolnoki

PLOS Computational Biology · 2026

DOI: 10.1371/journal.pcbi.1013512 ↗

Kurz gefasst

Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift PLOS Computational Biology, 2026. Verfasst von Lichen Wang und 5 weiteren Autor:innen. Beteiligte Einrichtung: College of Science, Northwest A & F University, Yangling, Shaanxi, China. Hauptthemen laut MEDLINE: Game Theory, Cooperative Behavior, Biological Evolution. Die Arbeit wurde bisher 5-mal zitiert (Crossref) und nennt 51 Literaturangaben. Der Volltext ist frei zugänglich (Open Access, CC BY 4.0). Gefördert von: National Natural Science Foundation of China, China Postdoctoral Science Foundation, Humanities and Social Science Fund of Ministry of Education of China.

AbstractSchlagwörterBibliografische AngabenZitierenVerwandte Studien

Abstract (Originalsprache)

Addressing both natural and societal challenges requires collective cooperation. Studies on collective-risk social dilemmas have shown that individual decisions are influenced by the perceived risk of collective failure. However, existing feedback-evolving game models often focus on a single feedback mechanism, such as the coupling between cooperation and risk or between cooperation and cost. In many real-world scenarios, however, the level of cooperation, the cost of cooperating, and the collective risk are dynamically interlinked. Here, we present an evolutionary game model that considers the interplay of these three variables. Our analysis shows that the worst-case scenario, characterized by full defection, maximum risk, and the highest cost of cooperation, remains a stable evolutionary attractor. Nevertheless, cooperation can emerge and persist because the system also supports stable equilibria with non-zero cooperation. The system exhibits multistability, meaning that different initial conditions lead to either sustained cooperation or a tragedy of the commons. These findings highlight that initial levels of cooperation, cost, and risk collectively determine whether a population can avert a tragic outcome.

Schlagwörter

MeSH-Schlagwörter (MEDLINE)

Game TheoryCooperative BehaviorBiological EvolutionHumansComputer SimulationComputational BiologyRisk

Autor:innen und Institutionen

  • College of Science, Northwest A & F University, Yangling, Shaanxi, China.
  • College of Economics & Management, Northwest A & F University, Yangling, Shaanxi, China.
  • Institute of Technical Physics and Materials Science, Centre for Energy Research, Budapest, Hungary.

ORCID-Profile: Yuyuan Liu, Linjie Liu

Förderung

  • National Natural Science Foundation of China
  • China Postdoctoral Science Foundation
  • Humanities and Social Science Fund of Ministry of Education of China
  • Shaanxi Province Postdoctoral Science Foundation
  • Nemzeti Kutatási Fejlesztési és Innovációs Hivatal

Zitieren

APA

Wang, L., Hua, S., Liu, Y., Zhang, L., Liu, L., & Szolnoki, A. (2026). Coevolutionary dynamics of cooperation, risk, and cost in collective risk games. PLOS Computational Biology. https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pcbi.1013512

Vancouver

Wang L, Hua S, Liu Y, Zhang L, Liu L, Szolnoki A. Coevolutionary dynamics of cooperation, risk, and cost in collective risk games. PLOS Computational Biology. 2026. doi:10.1371/journal.pcbi.1013512

BibTeX
@article{Wang2026,
  author = {Wang, Lichen and Hua, Shijia and Liu, Yuyuan and Zhang, Liang and Liu, Linjie and Szolnoki, Attila},
  title = {Coevolutionary dynamics of cooperation, risk, and cost in collective risk games},
  journal = {PLOS Computational Biology},
  year = {2026},
  doi = {10.1371/journal.pcbi.1013512}
}
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