Hacking measurement-device-independent quantum key distribution
Optica · 20.04.2023 · 10 (4) · 520
DOI: 10.1364/optica.485389 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift Optica, online erschienen am 20.04.2023. Verfasst von Feng-Yu Lu und 11 weiteren Autor:innen. Die Arbeit wurde bisher 67-mal zitiert (Crossref) und nennt 94 Literaturangaben. Gefördert von: National Key Research and Development Program of China, National Natural Science Foundation of China, China Postdoctoral Science Foundation.
Abstract (Originalsprache)
Decoy-state measurement-device-independent quantum key distribution (MDI-QKD) is regarded as one of the most promising protocols since it is physically immune to all fatal detection-side attacks. However, the loopholes in the source side still open side channels to eavesdroppers. Previous work has indicated that a system is insecure if its decoy-state modulation is inaccurate, but a practical method for Eve to exploit the inaccurate modulation is still absent. In this work, we propose a practical hacking method and provide a detailed theoretical analysis. Using our method, we experimentally hacked a MDI-QKD system and successfully obtained all final keys. By demonstrating the hacking experiment, we hope to bring attention to source-side security and provide inspiration for the development of protocols with better source-side security.
Förderung
- National Key Research and Development Program of China
- National Natural Science Foundation of China
- China Postdoctoral Science Foundation
Zitieren
APA
Lu, F., Ye, P., Wang, Z., Wang, S., Yin, Z., Wang, R., Huang, X., Chen, W., He, D., Fan-Yuan, G., Guo, G., & Han, Z. (2023). Hacking measurement-device-independent quantum key distribution. Optica, 10(4), 520. https://doi.org/10.1364/optica.485389
Vancouver
Lu F, Ye P, Wang Z, Wang S, Yin Z, Wang R, et al. Hacking measurement-device-independent quantum key distribution. Optica. 2023;10(4):520. doi:10.1364/optica.485389
BibTeX
@article{Lu2023,
author = {Lu, Feng-Yu and Ye, Peng and Wang, Ze-Hao and Wang, Shuang and Yin, Zhen-Qiang and Wang, Rong and Huang, Xiao-Juan and Chen, Wei and He, De-Yong and Fan-Yuan, Guan-Jie and Guo, Guang-Can and Han, Zheng-Fu},
title = {Hacking measurement-device-independent quantum key distribution},
journal = {Optica},
year = {2023},
volume = {10},
number = {4},
pages = {520},
doi = {10.1364/optica.485389}
}
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