A Nuclear Veto? The Credibility–Consensus Trade-Off and NATO Nuclear Use Procedures
Texas National Security Review · 2025
DOI: 10.1353/tns.00018 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift Texas National Security Review, 2025. Verfasst von Jacklyn Majnemer.
Abstract (Originalsprache)
Do NATO allies have a veto over the use of American nuclear weapons stationed in Europe? While the alliance has publicly indicated that a NATO nuclear mission would require consensus approval from the Nuclear Planning Group, NATO allies have limited practical means to veto American unilateral use of these weapons. The authorization procedures within NATO for the use of American nuclear weapons stationed in Europe pose inherent trade-offs between credibility and consensus. Meaningful consensus decision-making undermines the credibility of the American nuclear weapons on European soil, but enhancing credibility raises the risk of American nuclear use emanating from Europe that is unwanted by NATO allies. Given the recent erosion of the security environment and allies’ trust in the US, there are reasons to think that the tension between credibility and consensus might become more salient within NATO.
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APA
Majnemer, J. (2025). A Nuclear Veto? The Credibility–Consensus Trade-Off and NATO Nuclear Use Procedures. Texas National Security Review. https://doi.org/10.1353/tns.00018
Vancouver
Majnemer J. A Nuclear Veto? The Credibility–Consensus Trade-Off and NATO Nuclear Use Procedures. Texas National Security Review. 2025. doi:10.1353/tns.00018
BibTeX
@article{Majnemer2025,
author = {Majnemer, Jacklyn},
title = {A Nuclear Veto? The Credibility–Consensus Trade-Off and NATO Nuclear Use Procedures},
journal = {Texas National Security Review},
year = {2025},
doi = {10.1353/tns.00018}
}
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