Legal Deterrence by Denial: Strategic Initiative and International Law in the Gray Zone
Texas National Security Review · 2025
DOI: 10.1353/tns.00005 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift Texas National Security Review, 2025. Verfasst von Richard W. Maass. Die Arbeit wurde bisher 1-mal zitiert (Crossref).
Abstract (Originalsprache)
International security competition in the twenty-first century is likely to remain largely within the “gray zone”—a category of aggressive activities that threaten core aspects of statehood while avoiding the threshold of armed force that has traditionally legitimized military retaliation in self-defense. Gray zone activities lend strategic initiative to the aggressor, confronting defenders with difficult response decisions and often incentivizing them to tolerate relative losses rather than risk escalating conflict. International law and norms have indirectly helped constitute the gray zone, and they can also play a key role in helping to deter future gray zone threats. Combining strategic and legal analysis, this article explores the relationship between international law and the gray zone, develops a strategy of legal deterrence by denial tailored to address the central dilemma of strategic initiative, and lays the foundations for defensive-minded policymakers to undercut revisionist lawfare and deter gray zone aggression.
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APA
Maass, R. W. (2025). Legal Deterrence by Denial: Strategic Initiative and International Law in the Gray Zone. Texas National Security Review. https://doi.org/10.1353/tns.00005
Vancouver
Maass RW. Legal Deterrence by Denial: Strategic Initiative and International Law in the Gray Zone. Texas National Security Review. 2025. doi:10.1353/tns.00005
BibTeX
@article{Maass2025,
author = {Maass, Richard W.},
title = {Legal Deterrence by Denial: Strategic Initiative and International Law in the Gray Zone},
journal = {Texas National Security Review},
year = {2025},
doi = {10.1353/tns.00005}
}
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