Kant and African Philosophy: towards a meeting of minds
Philosophy East and West · 2026-05
DOI: 10.1353/pew.2026.a991088 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift Philosophy East and West, 2026-05. Verfasst von Jessica Lerm.
Abstract (Originalsprache)
Kantianism has long been the enemy of African Philosophy. In this paper, I aim to motivate the surprising – possibly even offensive – thesis that Kantianism needs the African aphorism for its completion, and vice versa. The African aphorism is the basic precept of African ethics, that is, “A person is a person through other persons”. I begin by describing my favoured, constructivist reading of this African aphorism, after which I outline the problem Kant faces in his famous derivation of the categorical imperative from the hypothetical imperative. I examine the solutions to this problem previously proposed by Korsgaard and Darwall, and, finding both wanting, go on to explain how I think the African aphorism can do what these others could not. We can, as Kant intended, derive the categorical imperative from the hypothetical imperative – but only with the additional, African premise that a person is a person through other persons.
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APA
Lerm, J. (2026). Kant and African Philosophy: towards a meeting of minds. Philosophy East and West. https://doi.org/10.1353/pew.2026.a991088
Vancouver
Lerm J. Kant and African Philosophy: towards a meeting of minds. Philosophy East and West. 2026. doi:10.1353/pew.2026.a991088
BibTeX
@article{Lerm2026,
author = {Lerm, Jessica},
title = {Kant and African Philosophy: towards a meeting of minds},
journal = {Philosophy East and West},
year = {2026},
doi = {10.1353/pew.2026.a991088}
}
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