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A Case against New Natural Law

Robert C. Koons

The Journal of Natural Law · 2026-03 · 2 (1) · 26-48

DOI: 10.1353/jnl.2026.a994335 ↗

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Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift The Journal of Natural Law, 2026-03. Verfasst von Robert C. Koons.

AbstractBibliografische AngabenZitierenVerwandte Studien

Abstract (Originalsprache)

I identify six issues that distinguish an Aristotelian-Thomistic conception of natural law from the New Natural Law of Finnis, Grisez, and Boyle. The most fundamental concerns the relationship between speculative and practical knowledge. The New Natural Lawyers assume the two modes of knowledge are wholly separate, while Aristotelians take them as distinct but overlapping. From this fundamental difference the others follow: two disjoint domains of fact corresponding to the two modes of knowledge versus reality as a unified whole accessible to us in two different ways, short versus long list of basic goods, two different accounts of the basis of deontological facts, strong versus weak incommensurability of basic goods, and a Cartesian versus hylomorphic account of action. In each case, I defend the Aristotelian alternative.

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APA

Koons, R. C. (2026). A Case against New Natural Law. The Journal of Natural Law, 2(1), 26-48. https://doi.org/10.1353/jnl.2026.a994335

Vancouver

Koons RC. A Case against New Natural Law. The Journal of Natural Law. 2026;2(1):26-48. doi:10.1353/jnl.2026.a994335

BibTeX
@article{Koons2026,
  author = {Koons, Robert C.},
  title = {A Case against New Natural Law},
  journal = {The Journal of Natural Law},
  year = {2026},
  volume = {2},
  number = {1},
  pages = {26--48},
  doi = {10.1353/jnl.2026.a994335}
}
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