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Soul and Body in Aristotle's Theory of Perception

Joshua Trubowitz

Journal of the History of Philosophy · 2026-04 · 64 (2) · 163-182

DOI: 10.1353/hph.2026.a986602 ↗

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Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift Journal of the History of Philosophy, 2026-04. Verfasst von Joshua Trubowitz.

AbstractBibliografische AngabenZitierenVerwandte Studien

Abstract (Originalsprache)

A widespread view has it that, for Aristotle, perception's psychological and physiological aspects are phenomenal consciousness and its underlying material basis. I argue on the contrary that they are judgment/discrimination and receptivity: in virtue of our sense organs, we are receptive to objects of perception; in virtue of our souls, we judge or discriminate these objects. In effect, Aristotle divides perception's active and passive aspects between soul and body. I defend this view with special attention to Aristotle's claim that our senses receive form without matter in perception.

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APA

Trubowitz, J. (2026). Soul and Body in Aristotle's Theory of Perception. Journal of the History of Philosophy, 64(2), 163-182. https://doi.org/10.1353/hph.2026.a986602

Vancouver

Trubowitz J. Soul and Body in Aristotle's Theory of Perception. Journal of the History of Philosophy. 2026;64(2):163-182. doi:10.1353/hph.2026.a986602

BibTeX
@article{Trubowitz2026,
  author = {Trubowitz, Joshua},
  title = {Soul and Body in Aristotle's Theory of Perception},
  journal = {Journal of the History of Philosophy},
  year = {2026},
  volume = {64},
  number = {2},
  pages = {163--182},
  doi = {10.1353/hph.2026.a986602}
}
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