Hume on Ill Will and the Possibility of Forgiveness
Hume Studies · 2026-04 · 51 (1) · 139-160
DOI: 10.1353/hms.2026.a989198 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift Hume Studies, 2026-04. Verfasst von Rachel Cohon.
Abstract (Originalsprache)
Hume's theory of the emotions and moral evaluation have consequences for the feasibility of forgiveness, even though he never addresses the topic. Intriguingly, it follows from Adam Smith's theory of the moral sentiments (which also fails to mention it) that forgiveness is conceptually impossible. After exhibiting this consequence of Smith's position, I consider whether Hume's accounts of hatred, ill will, and moral disapprobation also render forgiveness impossible. The answer depends on what interpretation we adopt of Hume's conception of moral evaluation. If we adopt a well-known view of what the moral sentiment is (the "hatred interpretation"), then yes, Hume does rule out forgiveness, though he makes it psychologically rather than conceptually impossible. If we reject the hatred interpretation but assume a noncognitivist reading of Hume's moral judgments, Hume allows minimal space for forgiveness under highly constrained circumstances. However, a cognitivist interpretation opens substantial additional opportunities for forgiveness.
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APA
Cohon, R. (2026). Hume on Ill Will and the Possibility of Forgiveness. Hume Studies, 51(1), 139-160. https://doi.org/10.1353/hms.2026.a989198
Vancouver
Cohon R. Hume on Ill Will and the Possibility of Forgiveness. Hume Studies. 2026;51(1):139-160. doi:10.1353/hms.2026.a989198
BibTeX
@article{Cohon2026,
author = {Cohon, Rachel},
title = {Hume on Ill Will and the Possibility of Forgiveness},
journal = {Hume Studies},
year = {2026},
volume = {51},
number = {1},
pages = {139--160},
doi = {10.1353/hms.2026.a989198}
}
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