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Hume's Conception of Malice and the Principle of Comparison: Raising Questions and Discovering Applications

Eva M. Dadlez

Hume Studies · 2026-04 · 51 (1) · 125-137

DOI: 10.1353/hms.2026.a989197 ↗

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Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift Hume Studies, 2026-04. Verfasst von Eva M. Dadlez.

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Abstract (Originalsprache)

This essay explores David Hume's account of malice, as well as the principle of comparison that underwrites the sentiment. Considered an indirect passion by Hume, malice "gives us a joy in the sufferings of others" in that these pains can make our own more fortunate circumstances appear more prominent by comparison. We will investigate the possibility that there may be two distinct types of malice when we canvas the intentional objects of the sentiment. Finally, malice will be held to serve a key explanatory function in a novel resolution of the paradox of tragedy.

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APA

Dadlez, E. M. (2026). Hume's Conception of Malice and the Principle of Comparison: Raising Questions and Discovering Applications. Hume Studies, 51(1), 125-137. https://doi.org/10.1353/hms.2026.a989197

Vancouver

Dadlez EM. Hume's Conception of Malice and the Principle of Comparison: Raising Questions and Discovering Applications. Hume Studies. 2026;51(1):125-137. doi:10.1353/hms.2026.a989197

BibTeX
@article{Dadlez2026,
  author = {Dadlez, Eva M.},
  title = {Hume's Conception of Malice and the Principle of Comparison: Raising Questions and Discovering Applications},
  journal = {Hume Studies},
  year = {2026},
  volume = {51},
  number = {1},
  pages = {125--137},
  doi = {10.1353/hms.2026.a989197}
}
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