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Rawls and Envy

Daniel Luban

Capitalism: A Journal of History and Economics · 2025-01 · 6 (1) · 209-246

DOI: 10.1353/cap.2025.a990855 ↗

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Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift Capitalism: A Journal of History and Economics, 2025-01. Verfasst von Daniel Luban.

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Abstract (Originalsprache)

One striking aspect of John Rawls's theory of justice is its exclusion of what Rawls calls "envy." The parties in his original position aim only to maximize their allotments of goods in absolute terms, lacking any concern for how they fare relative to others. Accordingly, the key feature of his famous "difference principle" is that it assesses the justice of relative inequalities solely by how they affect absolute allotments. The exclusion of envy is hardly an idiosyncrasy of Rawls's theory: viewed in broader historical perspective, it reflects a long-standing justification for capitalism, one emphasizing the ways in which economic growth lifts all boats in absolute terms even if it widens inequalities in relative ones. Yet Rawls's ambivalent treatment of envy—whose exclusion appears variably as a simplifying assumption, a psychological postulate, and a moral doctrine—reflects the broader difficulties of maintaining this line between absolute and relative.

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APA

Luban, D. (2025). Rawls and Envy. Capitalism: A Journal of History and Economics, 6(1), 209-246. https://doi.org/10.1353/cap.2025.a990855

Vancouver

Luban D. Rawls and Envy. Capitalism: A Journal of History and Economics. 2025;6(1):209-246. doi:10.1353/cap.2025.a990855

BibTeX
@article{Luban2025,
  author = {Luban, Daniel},
  title = {Rawls and Envy},
  journal = {Capitalism: A Journal of History and Economics},
  year = {2025},
  volume = {6},
  number = {1},
  pages = {209--246},
  doi = {10.1353/cap.2025.a990855}
}
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