U.S.-Vietnam Semiconductor Cooperation: Progress, Constraints, and Pathways Forward
Asia Policy · 2026-10 · 21 (4) · 157-184
DOI: 10.1353/asp.2026.a1007131 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift Asia Policy, 2026-10. Verfasst von Hoang Hien Thuong.
Abstract (Originalsprache)
executive summary: This article examines U.S.-Vietnam semiconductor relations since 2023, arguing that despite alignment under the two states' comprehensive strategic partnership (CSP), cooperation has yet to produce meaningful structural upgrading of Vietnam's position in the global semiconductor value chain. main argumentThe 2023 U.S.-Vietnam CSP marked a major upgrade in bilateral relations, with semiconductors identified as a central pillar of future cooperation. Yet progress to date has fallen short of initial expectations. This gap stems from two interacting factors. First, despite the upgrade, the U.S. has maintained a cautious approach toward Vietnam with policy incoherence and mixed signals that undermine momentum for deepening high-tech collaboration. This landscape has been further complicated by foreign and trade policy shifts under the Trump administration that have disrupted key cooperation mechanisms and increased uncertainty for U.S. firms. Second, and more fundamentally, Vietnam's domestic ecosystem continues to face structural constraints, including inadequate infrastructure, workforce shortages, and constraints in the business environment. These limitations weaken Vietnam's ability to attract and sustain high-value semiconductor cooperation. The CSP provides an important political framework but achieving its semiconductor ambitions will depend on credible policy support, firm-level confidence, and Vietnam's capacity to address domestic bottlenecks. policy implications • Vietnam should prioritize domestic capacity building as this remains the major challenge for deeper cooperation in the semiconductor sector. Without stronger infrastructure, a deeper talent pool, and a more predictable business environment, Vietnam will struggle to attract high-value and high-tech investment. Deepening engagement with U.S. firms and academic institutions is also crucial to anchor cooperation at the market level. • The U.S. should align its policy tools with the strategic logic of the CSP. The continuation of Vietnam's nonmarket economy status, restrictive export-controls, and high tariff pressures send mixed signals, weakening business confidence and limiting the momentum created by upgrading the partnership. • Both sides should prioritize advanced packaging and workforce development as practical areas of cooperation. These areas match Vietnam's current comparative advantages while supporting U.S. supply chain diversification, allowing cooperation to move gradually from low-value manufacturing toward more knowledge-intensive semiconductor activities.
Zitieren
APA
Thuong, H. H. (2026). U.S.-Vietnam Semiconductor Cooperation: Progress, Constraints, and Pathways Forward. Asia Policy, 21(4), 157-184. https://doi.org/10.1353/asp.2026.a1007131
Vancouver
Thuong HH. U.S.-Vietnam Semiconductor Cooperation: Progress, Constraints, and Pathways Forward. Asia Policy. 2026;21(4):157-184. doi:10.1353/asp.2026.a1007131
BibTeX
@article{Thuong2026,
author = {Thuong, Hoang Hien},
title = {U.S.-Vietnam Semiconductor Cooperation: Progress, Constraints, and Pathways Forward},
journal = {Asia Policy},
year = {2026},
volume = {21},
number = {4},
pages = {157--184},
doi = {10.1353/asp.2026.a1007131}
}
EUVIMED