Ideology as misrecognition
Global Discourse · 2024-02 · 14 (1) · 20-39
DOI: 10.1332/20437897y2023d000000025 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift Global Discourse, 2024-02. Verfasst von Titus Stahl. Die Arbeit wurde bisher 4-mal zitiert (Crossref) und nennt 53 Literaturangaben.
Abstract (Originalsprache)
Theories of recognition often acknowledge that some forms of recognition can be ideological. Only recently have authors also begun to ask whether all ideological phenomena involve a more basic form of misrecognition of epistemic agents. I argue that an expressivist reconstruction of the Marxian theory of ideology can help us to understand what forms of misrecognition are involved in ideology. According to this understanding, ideological discourses reflect the rules of hierarchical social practices and impose limits on the capacity of subjects to challenge dominant conceptual distinctions. While rational epistemic subjects will tend to experience such limits as misrecognition, this does not require any negative interpersonal attitudes on the part of others. Therefore, at least some forms of ideology involve primarily structural, rather than interpersonal, misrecognition. I argue that ideologies that persist without involving widespread false beliefs can best be understood in this way and that neoliberalism is a paradigmatic example of such an ideology.
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APA
Stahl, T. (2024). Ideology as misrecognition. Global Discourse, 14(1), 20-39. https://doi.org/10.1332/20437897y2023d000000025
Vancouver
Stahl T. Ideology as misrecognition. Global Discourse. 2024;14(1):20-39. doi:10.1332/20437897y2023d000000025
BibTeX
@article{Stahl2024,
author = {Stahl, Titus},
title = {Ideology as misrecognition},
journal = {Global Discourse},
year = {2024},
volume = {14},
number = {1},
pages = {20--39},
doi = {10.1332/20437897y2023d000000025}
}
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