The Collapse of Time, Self, and Consciousness: Toward an Ontology of Awareness
PhilPapers (PhilPapers Foundation) · 16.04.2026
DOI: 10.13140/rg.2.2.26012.24964 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift PhilPapers (PhilPapers Foundation), erschienen am 16.04.2026. Verfasst von Michele Riva.
Abstract (Originalsprache)
This paper argues that consciousness is not a fundamental feature of reality but a functional hallucination—an interface the mind constructs to make raw awareness navigable for embodied organisms. Drawing on Rovelli's relational physics, Husserlian phenomenology, and contemplative traditions, the argument proceeds in three moves: (1) time as lived experience is entirely a product of memory; (2) phenomenology can describe experience but cannot ground metaphysical claims about its nature; (3) removing memory collapses time, narrative, and selfhood, revealing a more fundamental layer—awareness—that is bare, undifferentiated, and without subject or object. Consciousness is redefined as situated, memory-dependent engagement with the world, while awareness is posited as its precondition. The paper concludes that the hard problem of consciousness is misformulated: the question is not how matter produces consciousness, but why there is awareness at all.
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APA
Riva, M. (2026). The Collapse of Time, Self, and Consciousness: Toward an Ontology of Awareness. PhilPapers (PhilPapers Foundation). https://doi.org/10.13140/rg.2.2.26012.24964
Vancouver
Riva M. The Collapse of Time, Self, and Consciousness: Toward an Ontology of Awareness. PhilPapers (PhilPapers Foundation). 2026. doi:10.13140/rg.2.2.26012.24964
BibTeX
@article{Riva2026,
author = {Riva, Michele},
title = {The Collapse of Time, Self, and Consciousness: Toward an Ontology of Awareness},
journal = {PhilPapers (PhilPapers Foundation)},
year = {2026},
doi = {10.13140/rg.2.2.26012.24964}
}
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