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Can an Enactivist Approach Entail the Extended Conscious Mind?

Qiantong Wu

Phenomenology and Mind · 2018

DOI: 10.13128/phe_mi-23624 ↗

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Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift Phenomenology and Mind, 2018. Verfasst von Qiantong Wu. Die Arbeit wurde bisher 1-mal zitiert (Crossref).

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Abstract (Originalsprache)

This paper discusses the enactivist attempt to entail the hypothesis of extended conscious mind (ECM). The enactists suggest that conscious experience is a relational interaction between the subject and the external environment; this personal-level description of conscious experience naturally entails an extended sub-personal characterization of the material basis of conscious experience (i.e. the ECM). However, in this paper, I am going to argue that the enactivist description at the personal level is still open to an internalist challenge at the sub-personal level. In response to this challenge, I suggest combining enactivism with the concept of predictive processing, delineating a sub-personal characterization of conscious experience that corresponds to the enactivist interpretation at the personal level.

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APA

Wu, Q. (2018). Can an Enactivist Approach Entail the Extended Conscious Mind?. Phenomenology and Mind. https://doi.org/10.13128/phe_mi-23624

Vancouver

Wu Q. Can an Enactivist Approach Entail the Extended Conscious Mind?. Phenomenology and Mind. 2018. doi:10.13128/phe_mi-23624

BibTeX
@article{Wu2018,
  author = {Wu, Qiantong},
  title = {Can an Enactivist Approach Entail the Extended Conscious Mind?},
  journal = {Phenomenology and Mind},
  year = {2018},
  doi = {10.13128/phe_mi-23624}
}
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