Animal Normativity
Phenomenology and Mind · 15.12.2019 · (17) · 176-187
DOI: 10.13128/pam-8035 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift Phenomenology and Mind, online erschienen am 15.12.2019. Verfasst von Laura Danón. Die Arbeit wurde bisher 1-mal zitiert (Crossref).
Abstract (Originalsprache)
Many philosophers think that human animals are the only normative creatures. In this paper, I will not provide reasons against such a claim, but I will engage in a related task: delineating and comparing two deflationary accounts of what non-human animal normativity could consist in. One of them is based on Hannah Ginsborg’s notion of primitive normativity and the other on my conjecture that some creatures may have first-order robust “ought-thoughts”, composed by secondary representations about how things should be or about how one should act. Once I have sketched both models, I will focus on identifying some cognitive differences between creatures merely having primitive normativity and those also having robust ought-thoughts. Finally, I will draw a few tentative remarks on the kind of empirical evidence that would suggest that an animal has one or another of these two kinds of normativity.
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APA
Danón, L. (2019). Animal Normativity. Phenomenology and Mind, 176-187. https://doi.org/10.13128/pam-8035
Vancouver
Danón L. Animal Normativity. Phenomenology and Mind. 2019:176-187. doi:10.13128/pam-8035
BibTeX
@article{Dann2019,
author = {Danón, Laura},
title = {Animal Normativity},
journal = {Phenomenology and Mind},
year = {2019},
number = {17},
pages = {176--187},
doi = {10.13128/pam-8035}
}
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