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Package Bids in Combinatorial Electricity Auctions: Selection, Welfare Losses, and Alternatives

Thomas Hübner, Gabriela Hug

Operations Research · 2026-01 · 74 (1) · 56-71

DOI: 10.1287/opre.2024.0777 ↗

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Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift Operations Research, 2026-01. Verfasst von Thomas Hübner und 1 weiteren Autor:innen. Die Arbeit wurde bisher 6-mal zitiert (Crossref) und nennt 52 Literaturangaben.

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Abstract (Originalsprache)

Day-ahead electricity auctions allow market participants to trade power for delivery the following day. In Europe, these auctions are designed as combinatorial auctions, enabling agents to submit package bids (“block bids”) that span multiple time periods rather than bidding separately for each hour. However, power exchanges impose limits on the number of package bids an agent can submit, creating a complex decision problem: Which packages should an agent bid on to best represent their preferences? In “Package Bids in Combinatorial Electricity Auctions: Selection, Welfare Losses, and Alternatives,” Hübner and Hug study this selection problem and propose decision-support algorithms that optimize bid choice under uncertainty. They provide theoretical bounds on welfare loss due to bid limits and validate their methods with simulations involving generators, storage systems, and flexible demand. Their findings offer actionable insights for both auctioneers and bidders.

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APA

Hübner, T., & Hug, G. (2026). Package Bids in Combinatorial Electricity Auctions: Selection, Welfare Losses, and Alternatives. Operations Research, 74(1), 56-71. https://doi.org/10.1287/opre.2024.0777

Vancouver

Hübner T, Hug G. Package Bids in Combinatorial Electricity Auctions: Selection, Welfare Losses, and Alternatives. Operations Research. 2026;74(1):56-71. doi:10.1287/opre.2024.0777

BibTeX
@article{Hbner2026,
  author = {Hübner, Thomas and Hug, Gabriela},
  title = {Package Bids in Combinatorial Electricity Auctions: Selection, Welfare Losses, and Alternatives},
  journal = {Operations Research},
  year = {2026},
  volume = {74},
  number = {1},
  pages = {56--71},
  doi = {10.1287/opre.2024.0777}
}
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