Automotive Procurement Under Opaque Prices: Theory with Evidence from the BMW Supply Chain
Management Science · 2024-06 · 70 (6) · 3664-3683
DOI: 10.1287/mnsc.2023.4880 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift Management Science, 2024-06. Verfasst von Danko Turcic und 3 weiteren Autor:innen. Die Arbeit wurde bisher 7-mal zitiert (Crossref) und nennt 32 Literaturangaben.
Abstract (Originalsprache)
Several features of automotive procurement distinguish it from the prototypical supply chain in the academic literature: pass-through pricing that reimburses suppliers for raw material costs, market frictions that prohibit cost transparency and imbue suppliers with pricing power, and contractual commitments that span multiple production periods. In this context, we formalize a procurement model by considering an automaker that buys components from an upstream supplier to assemble cars over several production periods in an environment where period demands and raw material costs are both stochastic. Our paper clarifies how information asymmetry and market factors that amplify or weaken this asymmetry affect the firms’ procurement protocol preferences. Then, using proprietary contract and supplier data from BMW, we empirically validate this model and show that it reflects BMW’s reality: the factors that should theoretically go into automotive procurement decisions do so. Our analysis also reveals that existing contracting protocols in this context are not optimal for procurement under asymmetric information, and so we propose an alternative contracting method. We calibrate our model and estimate an automaker’s performance improvement from this optimal contract over the status quo. This paper was accepted by Vishal Gaur, operations management. Supplemental Material: The data files and online appendices are available at https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2023.4880 .
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APA
Turcic, D., Markou, P., Kouvelis, P., & Corsten, D. (2024). Automotive Procurement Under Opaque Prices: Theory with Evidence from the BMW Supply Chain. Management Science, 70(6), 3664-3683. https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2023.4880
Vancouver
Turcic D, Markou P, Kouvelis P, Corsten D. Automotive Procurement Under Opaque Prices: Theory with Evidence from the BMW Supply Chain. Management Science. 2024;70(6):3664-3683. doi:10.1287/mnsc.2023.4880
BibTeX
@article{Turcic2024,
author = {Turcic, Danko and Markou, Panos and Kouvelis, Panos and Corsten, Daniel},
title = {Automotive Procurement Under Opaque Prices: Theory with Evidence from the BMW Supply Chain},
journal = {Management Science},
year = {2024},
volume = {70},
number = {6},
pages = {3664--3683},
doi = {10.1287/mnsc.2023.4880}
}
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