Crowd-Judging on Two-Sided Platforms: An Analysis of In-Group Bias
Management Science · 2024-04 · 70 (4) · 2459-2476
DOI: 10.1287/mnsc.2023.4818 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift Management Science, 2024-04. Verfasst von Alan P. Kwan und 2 weiteren Autor:innen. Die Arbeit wurde bisher 15-mal zitiert (Crossref) und nennt 62 Literaturangaben.
Abstract (Originalsprache)
Disputes over transactions on two-sided platforms are common and usually arbitrated through platforms’ customer service departments or third-party service providers. This paper studies crowd-judging, a novel crowdsourcing mechanism whereby users (buyers and sellers) volunteer as jurors to decide disputes arising from the platform. Using a rich data set from the dispute resolution center at Taobao, a leading Chinese e-commerce platform, we aim to understand this innovation and propose and analyze potential operational improvements with a focus on in-group bias (buyer jurors favor the buyer, likewise for sellers). Platform users, especially sellers, share the perception that in-group bias is prevalent and systematically sways case outcomes as the majority of users on such platforms are buyers, undermining the legitimacy of crowd-judging. Our empirical findings suggest that such concern is not completely unfounded: on average, a seller juror is approximately 10% likelier (than a buyer juror) to vote for a seller. Such bias is aggravated among cases that are decided by a thin margin and when jurors perceive that their in-group’s interests are threatened. However, the bias diminishes as jurors gain experience: a user’s bias reduces by nearly 95% as experience grows from zero to the sample median level. Incorporating these findings and juror participation dynamics in a simulation study, the paper delivers three managerial insights. First, under the existing voting policy, in-group bias influences the outcomes of no more than 2% of cases. Second, simply increasing crowd size through either a larger case panel or aggressively recruiting new jurors may not be efficient in reducing the adverse effect of in-group bias. Finally, policies that allocate cases dynamically could simultaneously mitigate the impact of in-group bias and nurture a more sustainable juror pool. This paper was accepted by Vishal Gaur, operations management. Funding: S. A. Yang and A. Zhang acknowledge the support of the Hong Kong General Research Fund [Grant “Decentralizing Platform Governance: Innovations from China; Project 17614921]. Supplemental Material: The online appendix and data are available at https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2023.4818 .
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APA
Kwan, A. P., Yang, S. A., & Zhang, A. H. (2024). Crowd-Judging on Two-Sided Platforms: An Analysis of In-Group Bias. Management Science, 70(4), 2459-2476. https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2023.4818
Vancouver
Kwan AP, Yang SA, Zhang AH. Crowd-Judging on Two-Sided Platforms: An Analysis of In-Group Bias. Management Science. 2024;70(4):2459-2476. doi:10.1287/mnsc.2023.4818
BibTeX
@article{Kwan2024,
author = {Kwan, Alan P. and Yang, S. Alex and Zhang, Angela Huyue},
title = {Crowd-Judging on Two-Sided Platforms: An Analysis of In-Group Bias},
journal = {Management Science},
year = {2024},
volume = {70},
number = {4},
pages = {2459--2476},
doi = {10.1287/mnsc.2023.4818}
}
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