Common Ownership, Competition, and Corporate Governance
Management Science · 2025-05 · 71 (5) · 3924-3943
DOI: 10.1287/mnsc.2023.03467 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift Management Science, 2025-05. Verfasst von Vincenzo Denicolò und 1 weiteren Autor:innen. Die Arbeit wurde bisher 21-mal zitiert (Crossref) und nennt 30 Literaturangaben.
Abstract (Originalsprache)
This paper presents a theoretical framework for determining the ownership stakes held by financial investors in companies competing in the same product market, commonly referred to as the level of common ownership. In our model, these investors are primarily motivated by the anticipation of capital gains resulting from the impact of common ownership on product market competition, which enhances profitability for the firms involved. However, common ownership also undermines effective corporate governance by diminishing blockholders’ incentives to engage in value-enhancing behaviors, such as managerial monitoring. These adverse effects on corporate governance act as limiting factors, ultimately determining the equilibrium level of common ownership. This paper was accepted by Joshua Gans, business strategy.
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APA
Denicolò, V., & Panunzi, F. (2025). Common Ownership, Competition, and Corporate Governance. Management Science, 71(5), 3924-3943. https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2023.03467
Vancouver
Denicolò V, Panunzi F. Common Ownership, Competition, and Corporate Governance. Management Science. 2025;71(5):3924-3943. doi:10.1287/mnsc.2023.03467
BibTeX
@article{Denicol2025,
author = {Denicolò, Vincenzo and Panunzi, Fausto},
title = {Common Ownership, Competition, and Corporate Governance},
journal = {Management Science},
year = {2025},
volume = {71},
number = {5},
pages = {3924--3943},
doi = {10.1287/mnsc.2023.03467}
}
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