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Soft Collateral, Bank Lending, and the Optimal Credit Registry

Lixin Huang, Andrew Winton

Management Science · 05.05.2026

DOI: 10.1287/mnsc.2023.01327 ↗

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Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift Management Science, online erschienen am 05.05.2026. Verfasst von Lixin Huang und 1 weiteren Autor:innen. Die Arbeit nennt 29 Literaturangaben.

AbstractBibliografische AngabenZitierenVerwandte Studien

Abstract (Originalsprache)

We study the design of an optimal credit registry in a general equilibrium steady-state setting where borrowers can default strategically and future access to credit markets serves as soft collateral to enforce loan repayment. We endogenize the probabilities for exclusion after default and subsequent reinstatement of clean credit records. When there are sufficient funds, optimal credit stringency is as loose as possible, subject to borrowers’ incentive constraints. When there are insufficient funds, credit stringency is driven by the need to equilibrate nonexcluded borrowers with available funds, and it increases as the imbalance grows. We examine how population growth, mortality, and persistence affect our results. Finally, we compare the simple two-tier scheme with the three-tier scheme and characterize solutions to a general N-tier registry. We show that a more graduated registry is not necessarily a better one. This paper was accepted by Will Cong, finance.

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APA

Huang, L., & Winton, A. (2026). Soft Collateral, Bank Lending, and the Optimal Credit Registry. Management Science. https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2023.01327

Vancouver

Huang L, Winton A. Soft Collateral, Bank Lending, and the Optimal Credit Registry. Management Science. 2026. doi:10.1287/mnsc.2023.01327

BibTeX
@article{Huang2026,
  author = {Huang, Lixin and Winton, Andrew},
  title = {Soft Collateral, Bank Lending, and the Optimal Credit Registry},
  journal = {Management Science},
  year = {2026},
  doi = {10.1287/mnsc.2023.01327}
}
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