Voluntary Precision Disclosure and Endogenous Market Feedback
Management Science · 2023-09 · 69 (9) · 5618-5637
DOI: 10.1287/mnsc.2022.4577 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift Management Science, 2023-09. Verfasst von Jan Schneemeier. Die Arbeit wurde bisher 26-mal zitiert (Crossref) und nennt 69 Literaturangaben.
Abstract (Originalsprache)
We explore a manager’s incentives to disclose the precision of a signal about firm profitability. Voluntary disclosure of precision information encourages traders to acquire private information, increasing price informativeness and improving the firm’s investment efficiency. We highlight a novel tradeoff: on the one hand, more precise public information crowds out traders’ information acquisition by leveling the playing field. On the other hand, there can also be a crowding-in effect because high-precision disclosures indicate greater managerial confidence and higher investment, which increases the traders’ value of information. The crowding-in effect can dominate if the firm discloses above-average profitability. We derive testable predictions regarding the financial market consequences of supplemental disclosures that are informative about the precision or relevance of payoff-related signals. This paper was accepted by Brian Bushee, accounting.
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APA
Schneemeier, J. (2023). Voluntary Precision Disclosure and Endogenous Market Feedback. Management Science, 69(9), 5618-5637. https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2022.4577
Vancouver
Schneemeier J. Voluntary Precision Disclosure and Endogenous Market Feedback. Management Science. 2023;69(9):5618-5637. doi:10.1287/mnsc.2022.4577
BibTeX
@article{Schneemeier2023,
author = {Schneemeier, Jan},
title = {Voluntary Precision Disclosure and Endogenous Market Feedback},
journal = {Management Science},
year = {2023},
volume = {69},
number = {9},
pages = {5618--5637},
doi = {10.1287/mnsc.2022.4577}
}
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