Disaster Lending: “Fair” Prices but “Unfair” Access
Management Science · 2024-12 · 70 (12) · 8484-8505
DOI: 10.1287/mnsc.2021.03199 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift Management Science, 2024-12. Verfasst von Taylor A. Begley und 3 weiteren Autor:innen. Die Arbeit wurde bisher 10-mal zitiert (Crossref) und nennt 35 Literaturangaben.
Abstract (Originalsprache)
We find the Small Business Administration’s disaster-relief home loan program denies significantly more loans in areas with larger shares of minorities, subprime borrowers, and higher income inequality. We find that risk-insensitive loan pricing, a feature present in many regulated and government-run lending programs, is an important driver of these disparities in access to credit. The differences in denial rates are disproportionately high compared with private-market lending and government-insured risk-sensitive loan pricing programs. Thus, despite ensuring “fair” prices, the use of risk-insensitive pricing may lead to “unfair” access to credit. This paper was accepted by Victoria Ivashina, finance. Supplemental Material: The online appendix and data files are available at https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2021.03199 .
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APA
Begley, T. A., Gurun, U. G., Purnanandam, A., & Weagley, D. (2024). Disaster Lending: “Fair” Prices but “Unfair” Access. Management Science, 70(12), 8484-8505. https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2021.03199
Vancouver
Begley TA, Gurun UG, Purnanandam A, Weagley D. Disaster Lending: “Fair” Prices but “Unfair” Access. Management Science. 2024;70(12):8484-8505. doi:10.1287/mnsc.2021.03199
BibTeX
@article{Begley2024,
author = {Begley, Taylor A. and Gurun, Umit G. and Purnanandam, Amiyatosh and Weagley, Daniel},
title = {Disaster Lending: “Fair” Prices but “Unfair” Access},
journal = {Management Science},
year = {2024},
volume = {70},
number = {12},
pages = {8484--8505},
doi = {10.1287/mnsc.2021.03199}
}
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