Revenue in First- and Second-Price Display Advertising Auctions: Understanding Markets with Learning Agents
Information Systems Research · 17.08.2026
DOI: 10.1287/isre.2025.2160 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift Information Systems Research, online erschienen am 17.08.2026. Verfasst von Martin Bichler und 2 weiteren Autor:innen. Die Arbeit nennt 66 Literaturangaben.
Abstract (Originalsprache)
Display advertising exchanges have largely shifted from second-price to first-price auctions, but the revenue and policy implications of this change remain contested. This paper studies a key mechanism often overlooked in this debate: that automated bidding agents typically optimize return on investment rather than standard profit and that they learn bidding strategies from repeated market feedback. In a benchmark model of display ad auctions, we show that this objective alone can make first-price auctions generate lower expected revenue than second-price auctions, even when bidders behave according to equilibrium and without algorithmic collusion. Simulations with common bandit-based bidding algorithms further show that agents lean toward these benchmark equilibria rather than systematically suppressing bids. For exchanges and publishers, the results caution against interpreting revenue declines after first-price adoption as direct evidence of collusion. For advertisers and demand-side platforms, they highlight how return of investment-based objectives shape bidding incentives and auction outcomes. For regulators, the findings suggest that platform investigations should distinguish collusive learning from noncollusive revenue effects caused by bidder objectives, feedback, and auction design.
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APA
Bichler, M., Gupta, A., & Oberlechner, M. (2026). Revenue in First- and Second-Price Display Advertising Auctions: Understanding Markets with Learning Agents. Information Systems Research. https://doi.org/10.1287/isre.2025.2160
Vancouver
Bichler M, Gupta A, Oberlechner M. Revenue in First- and Second-Price Display Advertising Auctions: Understanding Markets with Learning Agents. Information Systems Research. 2026. doi:10.1287/isre.2025.2160
BibTeX
@article{Bichler2026,
author = {Bichler, Martin and Gupta, Alok and Oberlechner, Matthias},
title = {Revenue in First- and Second-Price Display Advertising Auctions: Understanding Markets with Learning Agents},
journal = {Information Systems Research},
year = {2026},
doi = {10.1287/isre.2025.2160}
}
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