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Asymmetric and Contingent Value of Crowd Wisdom in Crowdfunding

Shengsheng Xiao, Yi-Chun Chad Ho, Subhasish Dasgupta, Hailiang Huang, Zhijie Lin

Information Systems Research · 02.03.2026

DOI: 10.1287/isre.2022.0631 ↗

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Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift Information Systems Research, online erschienen am 02.03.2026. Verfasst von Shengsheng Xiao und 4 weiteren Autor:innen. Die Arbeit nennt 47 Literaturangaben.

AbstractBibliografische AngabenZitierenVerwandte Studien

Abstract (Originalsprache)

Digital crowdfunding platforms operate under substantial uncertainty, where participants must assess platform viability with limited and imperfect information. Using data from the Chinese lending-based crowdfunding market, this study shows that platform growth depends not only on formal risk disclosures (e.g., interest rates, repayment ratios, and capitalization), but also on how users interpret the behavior of others as an informational signal. Specifically, we find that active user participation—particularly on the investor side—serves as a powerful form of “crowd wisdom” that shapes subsequent borrower participation, while borrower growth does not symmetrically attract investors. Importantly, the value of crowd-based signals is contingent: when formal risk indicators suggest greater uncertainty or weaker platform viability, users rely more heavily on observed participation by others; when risk signals are strong and favorable, the incremental influence of crowd cues diminishes. These findings offer several practical insights. Platform operators should recognize investor participation as a credibility signal and prioritize investor acquisition and retention, especially during periods of heightened uncertainty. Platform interface design and disclosure policies should balance formal risk information with transparent participation metrics, rather than treating them as substitutes. From a policy perspective, our results suggest that participation metrics can meaningfully shape user behavior even in the absence of misrepresentation, highlighting the need for regulators to consider how visibility rules, reporting standards, and disclosure requirements interact with social learning dynamics on digital financial platforms.

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APA

Xiao, S., Ho, Y. C., Dasgupta, S., Huang, H., & Lin, Z. (2026). Asymmetric and Contingent Value of Crowd Wisdom in Crowdfunding. Information Systems Research. https://doi.org/10.1287/isre.2022.0631

Vancouver

Xiao S, Ho YC, Dasgupta S, Huang H, Lin Z. Asymmetric and Contingent Value of Crowd Wisdom in Crowdfunding. Information Systems Research. 2026. doi:10.1287/isre.2022.0631

BibTeX
@article{Xiao2026,
  author = {Xiao, Shengsheng and Ho, Yi-Chun Chad and Dasgupta, Subhasish and Huang, Hailiang and Lin, Zhijie},
  title = {Asymmetric and Contingent Value of Crowd Wisdom in Crowdfunding},
  journal = {Information Systems Research},
  year = {2026},
  doi = {10.1287/isre.2022.0631}
}
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