The Modest, or Quantificational, Account of Truth
Studia Philosophica Estonica · 2008
DOI: 10.12697/spe.2008.1.2.01 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift Studia Philosophica Estonica, 2008. Verfasst von Wolfgang Künne. Die Arbeit wurde bisher 6-mal zitiert (Crossref).
Abstract (Originalsprache)
Truth is a stable, epistemically unconstrained property of propositions, and the concept of truth admits of a non-reductive explanation: that, in a nutshell, is the view for which I argued in Conceptions of Truth. In this paper I try to explain that explanation in a more detailed and, hopefully, more perspicuous way than I did in Ch. 6.2 of the book and to defend its use of sentential quantification against some of the criticisms it has has come in for.
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APA
Künne, W. (2008). The Modest, or Quantificational, Account of Truth. Studia Philosophica Estonica. https://doi.org/10.12697/spe.2008.1.2.01
Vancouver
Künne W. The Modest, or Quantificational, Account of Truth. Studia Philosophica Estonica. 2008. doi:10.12697/spe.2008.1.2.01
BibTeX
@article{Knne2008,
author = {Künne, Wolfgang},
title = {The Modest, or Quantificational, Account of Truth},
journal = {Studia Philosophica Estonica},
year = {2008},
doi = {10.12697/spe.2008.1.2.01}
}
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