Hurricanes, Climate Change Policies, and Electoral Accountability
American Economic Journal: Economic Policy · 01.08.2026 · 18 (3) · 135-162
DOI: 10.1257/pol.20230070 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift American Economic Journal: Economic Policy, erschienen am 01.08.2026. Verfasst von Stefano Gagliarducci und 2 weiteren Autor:innen. Die Arbeit nennt 62 Literaturangaben.
Abstract (Originalsprache)
This paper studies the conditions under which legislators promote policies that may be unpopular in the short term but yield long-term benefits. Using data on the universe of federal disaster declarations from 1989 to 2020, we document that representatives from congressional districts impacted by hurricanes are more inclined to support environmental legislation addressing climate change. However, this response depends on political circumstances: Only those in safe seats can change their political agenda toward policies that involve short-term costs for long-term gains. These results highlight the role of electoral incentives in shaping politicians' attitudes toward farsighted policymaking. (JEL D72, Q54, Q58)
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APA
Gagliarducci, S., Paserman, M. D., & Patacchini, E. (2026). Hurricanes, Climate Change Policies, and Electoral Accountability. American Economic Journal: Economic Policy, 18(3), 135-162. https://doi.org/10.1257/pol.20230070
Vancouver
Gagliarducci S, Paserman MD, Patacchini E. Hurricanes, Climate Change Policies, and Electoral Accountability. American Economic Journal: Economic Policy. 2026;18(3):135-162. doi:10.1257/pol.20230070
BibTeX
@article{Gagliarducci2026,
author = {Gagliarducci, Stefano and Paserman, M. Daniele and Patacchini, Eleonora},
title = {Hurricanes, Climate Change Policies, and Electoral Accountability},
journal = {American Economic Journal: Economic Policy},
year = {2026},
volume = {18},
number = {3},
pages = {135--162},
doi = {10.1257/pol.20230070}
}
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