Government Transfers and Votes for State Intervention
American Economic Journal: Economic Policy · 01.08.2024 · 16 (3) · 451-480
DOI: 10.1257/pol.20220452 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift American Economic Journal: Economic Policy, erschienen am 01.08.2024. Verfasst von Giuseppe Albanese und 2 weiteren Autor:innen. Die Arbeit wurde bisher 2-mal zitiert (Crossref) und nennt 50 Literaturangaben.
Abstract (Originalsprache)
Government transfers might have long-lasting consequences on electoral outcomes. We study a regional policy implemented in Italy over the second half of the twentieth century and leverage variation in transfers to show that parties promoting more state intervention in the economy performed better in the targeted areas relative to places that were not subsidized, decades after the end of the policy. This effect does not seem to mirror long-term differences in the economic performance of treated and control areas, which were small, nor other attitudes within the electorate. (JEL D72, H76, I38, N34, N44, R53)
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APA
Albanese, G., Blasio, G. D., & Incoronato, L. (2024). Government Transfers and Votes for State Intervention. American Economic Journal: Economic Policy, 16(3), 451-480. https://doi.org/10.1257/pol.20220452
Vancouver
Albanese G, Blasio GD, Incoronato L. Government Transfers and Votes for State Intervention. American Economic Journal: Economic Policy. 2024;16(3):451-480. doi:10.1257/pol.20220452
BibTeX
@article{Albanese2024,
author = {Albanese, Giuseppe and Blasio, Guido de and Incoronato, Lorenzo},
title = {Government Transfers and Votes for State Intervention},
journal = {American Economic Journal: Economic Policy},
year = {2024},
volume = {16},
number = {3},
pages = {451--480},
doi = {10.1257/pol.20220452}
}
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