Noncompete Agreements and Bargaining Power
AEA Papers and Proceedings · 01.05.2026 · 116 · 267-272
DOI: 10.1257/pandp.20261077 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift AEA Papers and Proceedings, erschienen am 01.05.2026. Verfasst von Bhargav Gopal und 2 weiteren Autor:innen. Die Arbeit nennt 13 Literaturangaben.
Abstract (Originalsprache)
Noncompete agreements (NCs) present a trade-off between firm investment incentives and allocative efficiency. We illustrate this trade-off using a contract choice model in which NCs encourage industry-specific investments and wages are determined by bargaining. When worker bargaining power is sufficiently high, the NC and no-NC contracts are identical, as neither contract yields firm-provided investments. When firms have all the bargaining power, NCs encourage industry-specific investments but lower wage growth. Empirically, the wage gains from NCs are driven by nonnegotiators, aligning with our model's interpretation that NCs encourage firms to provide transferable skills when they have substantial bargaining power.
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APA
Gopal, B., Li, X., & Rawling, L. (2026). Noncompete Agreements and Bargaining Power. AEA Papers and Proceedings, 116, 267-272. https://doi.org/10.1257/pandp.20261077
Vancouver
Gopal B, Li X, Rawling L. Noncompete Agreements and Bargaining Power. AEA Papers and Proceedings. 2026;116:267-272. doi:10.1257/pandp.20261077
BibTeX
@article{Gopal2026,
author = {Gopal, Bhargav and Li, Xiangru and Rawling, Luke},
title = {Noncompete Agreements and Bargaining Power},
journal = {AEA Papers and Proceedings},
year = {2026},
volume = {116},
pages = {267--272},
doi = {10.1257/pandp.20261077}
}
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