Can Sanctions Deter Wars? The Russia-Ukraine Case
AEA Papers and Proceedings · 01.05.2026 · 116 · 114-118
DOI: 10.1257/pandp.20261071 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift AEA Papers and Proceedings, erschienen am 01.05.2026. Verfasst von Thierry Mayer und 2 weiteren Autor:innen. Die Arbeit nennt 7 Literaturangaben.
Abstract (Originalsprache)
Our paper simulates a model of trade, diplomacy, and wars, calibrated to be relevant for analyzing the conflict between Russia and Ukraine. The quantitative results show that Ukraine’s decoupling from Russia after the 2014 annexation of Crimea reduced its economic exposure to war but also increased the likelihood of conflict by lowering its opportunity cost of war. We then simulate sanction scenarios and find that the 2024 package, if credibly announced in 2021 and made contingent on further aggression, would have significantly raised Russia’s cost of war and could have deterred the 2022 invasion.
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APA
Mayer, T., Méjean, I., & Thoenig, M. (2026). Can Sanctions Deter Wars? The Russia-Ukraine Case. AEA Papers and Proceedings, 116, 114-118. https://doi.org/10.1257/pandp.20261071
Vancouver
Mayer T, Méjean I, Thoenig M. Can Sanctions Deter Wars? The Russia-Ukraine Case. AEA Papers and Proceedings. 2026;116:114-118. doi:10.1257/pandp.20261071
BibTeX
@article{Mayer2026,
author = {Mayer, Thierry and Méjean, Isabelle and Thoenig, Mathias},
title = {Can Sanctions Deter Wars? The Russia-Ukraine Case},
journal = {AEA Papers and Proceedings},
year = {2026},
volume = {116},
pages = {114--118},
doi = {10.1257/pandp.20261071}
}
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