What Drives Money Competition: Comparative Advantage in Payments versus Reserves
AEA Papers and Proceedings · 01.05.2026 · 116 · 439-445
DOI: 10.1257/pandp.20261024 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift AEA Papers and Proceedings, erschienen am 01.05.2026. Verfasst von Itay Goldstein und 2 weiteren Autor:innen. Die Arbeit nennt 6 Literaturangaben.
Abstract (Originalsprache)
We study competition between monies that provide separate payment and nonpayment (e.g., store-of-value) functions. Payment adoption is governed by comparative advantage across these two functions rather than by absolute payment superiority. A money that is too good as a store of value may circulate less even if it is technologically superior because agents prefer to hoard it. The model helps understand historical money competition and current debates over stablecoins and central bank digital currencies, showing that higher yields can weaken, rather than strengthen, the payment adoption of interest-bearing digital currencies and potentially allow traditional bank deposits to retain payment dominance.
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APA
Goldstein, I., Yang, M., & Zeng, Y. (2026). What Drives Money Competition: Comparative Advantage in Payments versus Reserves. AEA Papers and Proceedings, 116, 439-445. https://doi.org/10.1257/pandp.20261024
Vancouver
Goldstein I, Yang M, Zeng Y. What Drives Money Competition: Comparative Advantage in Payments versus Reserves. AEA Papers and Proceedings. 2026;116:439-445. doi:10.1257/pandp.20261024
BibTeX
@article{Goldstein2026,
author = {Goldstein, Itay and Yang, Ming and Zeng, Yao},
title = {What Drives Money Competition: Comparative Advantage in Payments versus Reserves},
journal = {AEA Papers and Proceedings},
year = {2026},
volume = {116},
pages = {439--445},
doi = {10.1257/pandp.20261024}
}
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