The Economics of Discriminatory Job Reservations
American Economic Journal: Microeconomics · 01.08.2026 · 18 (3) · 361-391
DOI: 10.1257/mic.20250072 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, erschienen am 01.08.2026. Verfasst von James P. Choy. Die Arbeit nennt 51 Literaturangaben.
Abstract (Originalsprache)
A society reserves certain jobs for members of a politically dominant social group to maximize the wages of workers in that group. Through an appropriate choice of reserved jobs, the dominant group chooses both the size of the set of reserved jobs and the elasticity of substitution between reserved and unreserved jobs. Optimal discrimination endogenously creates categories of “good” and “bad” jobs and assigns workers from different social groups into these different categories. The relative scarcity of labor determines whether discrimination or free labor markets are optimal. I apply the model to apartheid South Africa and other discriminatory societies. (JEL H22, J15, J22, J31, J42, J71, N37)
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APA
Choy, J. P. (2026). The Economics of Discriminatory Job Reservations. American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, 18(3), 361-391. https://doi.org/10.1257/mic.20250072
Vancouver
Choy JP. The Economics of Discriminatory Job Reservations. American Economic Journal: Microeconomics. 2026;18(3):361-391. doi:10.1257/mic.20250072
BibTeX
@article{Choy2026,
author = {Choy, James P.},
title = {The Economics of Discriminatory Job Reservations},
journal = {American Economic Journal: Microeconomics},
year = {2026},
volume = {18},
number = {3},
pages = {361--391},
doi = {10.1257/mic.20250072}
}
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