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Higher-Order Beliefs and (Mis)learning from Prices

Kevin He, Jonathan Libgober

American Economic Journal: Microeconomics · 01.08.2026 · 18 (3) · 105-147

DOI: 10.1257/mic.20240346 ↗

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Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, erschienen am 01.08.2026. Verfasst von Kevin He und 1 weiteren Autor:innen. Die Arbeit nennt 23 Literaturangaben.

AbstractBibliografische AngabenZitierenVerwandte Studien

Abstract (Originalsprache)

We study misperceptions of private-signal correlation in an incomplete-information Cournot duopoly game. Exaggerating the correlation between players' demand signals is beneficial when agents hold flexible beliefs about price elasticity but is harmful when their beliefs are dogmatically correct. For agents with flexible beliefs who learn elasticity by observing prices, correlation misperceptions indirectly distort behavior through elasticity misinference. If agents know the true elasticity, this learning channel is eliminated. Correlation misperceptions have opposite direct and indirect effects on behavior, so the presence of elasticity inference can reverse an error's viability. (JEL C72, D21, D43, D81, D82, D83)

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APA

He, K., & Libgober, J. (2026). Higher-Order Beliefs and (Mis)learning from Prices. American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, 18(3), 105-147. https://doi.org/10.1257/mic.20240346

Vancouver

He K, Libgober J. Higher-Order Beliefs and (Mis)learning from Prices. American Economic Journal: Microeconomics. 2026;18(3):105-147. doi:10.1257/mic.20240346

BibTeX
@article{He2026,
  author = {He, Kevin and Libgober, Jonathan},
  title = {Higher-Order Beliefs and (Mis)learning from Prices},
  journal = {American Economic Journal: Microeconomics},
  year = {2026},
  volume = {18},
  number = {3},
  pages = {105--147},
  doi = {10.1257/mic.20240346}
}
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