Voter Information and Distributive Politics
American Economic Journal: Microeconomics · 01.05.2026 · 18 (2) · 293-312
DOI: 10.1257/mic.20240340 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, erschienen am 01.05.2026. Verfasst von Benjamin Blumenthal. Die Arbeit nennt 59 Literaturangaben.
Abstract (Originalsprache)
Does more information benefit voters? I examine this question in a novel setting of distributive politics and electoral accountability. Homogeneously informed electorates can benefit from less information through improvements in the control or screening of politicians. For heterogeneously informed electorates, I show that the distribution of resources and voter welfare is affected by the nature of informational heterogeneity and by voters’ ability to communicate with each other, making less-informed voters better off than their more-informed counterparts in some cases. (JEL D72, D82, D83, H50)
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APA
Blumenthal, B. (2026). Voter Information and Distributive Politics. American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, 18(2), 293-312. https://doi.org/10.1257/mic.20240340
Vancouver
Blumenthal B. Voter Information and Distributive Politics. American Economic Journal: Microeconomics. 2026;18(2):293-312. doi:10.1257/mic.20240340
BibTeX
@article{Blumenthal2026,
author = {Blumenthal, Benjamin},
title = {Voter Information and Distributive Politics},
journal = {American Economic Journal: Microeconomics},
year = {2026},
volume = {18},
number = {2},
pages = {293--312},
doi = {10.1257/mic.20240340}
}
EUVIMED