Self-Enforced Job Matching
American Economic Journal: Microeconomics · 01.05.2026 · 18 (2) · 110-145
DOI: 10.1257/mic.20240280 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, erschienen am 01.05.2026. Verfasst von Ce Liu und 2 weiteren Autor:innen. Die Arbeit nennt 44 Literaturangaben.
Abstract (Originalsprache)
Complementarities and peer effects are common in matching markets, yet incorporating them often leads to nonexistence of stable matchings. We observe that matching is often an ongoing process rather than a static allocation, where long-lived firms interact over time with short-lived workers. We show that when wages are flexible and firms are sufficiently patient, a dynamically stable solution always exists in many-to-one matching markets — even with complementarities and peer effects. Flexible wages are crucial to our result, as they not only facilitate surplus extraction when firms cooperate in no-poaching agreements but also enhance the threat of punishment through bidding wars. (JEL C72, C73, C78, D21, D62, J31, J41)
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APA
Liu, C., Wang, Z., & Zhang, H. (2026). Self-Enforced Job Matching. American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, 18(2), 110-145. https://doi.org/10.1257/mic.20240280
Vancouver
Liu C, Wang Z, Zhang H. Self-Enforced Job Matching. American Economic Journal: Microeconomics. 2026;18(2):110-145. doi:10.1257/mic.20240280
BibTeX
@article{Liu2026,
author = {Liu, Ce and Wang, Ziwei and Zhang, Hanzhe},
title = {Self-Enforced Job Matching},
journal = {American Economic Journal: Microeconomics},
year = {2026},
volume = {18},
number = {2},
pages = {110--145},
doi = {10.1257/mic.20240280}
}
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