Opportunity Hunters: A Model of Competitive Sequential Inspections
American Economic Journal: Microeconomics · 01.05.2026 · 18 (2) · 228-267
DOI: 10.1257/mic.20240245 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, erschienen am 01.05.2026. Verfasst von Ran Eilat und 2 weiteren Autor:innen. Die Arbeit nennt 39 Literaturangaben.
Abstract (Originalsprache)
We introduce a new type of games, called “opportunity-hunting games,” in which two players compete to discover an uncertain event (“opportunity”) that occurs at an unobserved and random point in time. Players can inspect whether the event has already occurred again and again, but each inspection is costly. Varying the parameters of the model spans the range from games where competition between the players to be the first to identify the opportunity is the dominant force, to games in which free riding on the other player’s effort is the dominant force. We characterize the game’s unique symmetric Markov perfect equilibrium. (JEL C72, C73)
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APA
Eilat, R., Neeman, Z., & Solan, E. (2026). Opportunity Hunters: A Model of Competitive Sequential Inspections. American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, 18(2), 228-267. https://doi.org/10.1257/mic.20240245
Vancouver
Eilat R, Neeman Z, Solan E. Opportunity Hunters: A Model of Competitive Sequential Inspections. American Economic Journal: Microeconomics. 2026;18(2):228-267. doi:10.1257/mic.20240245
BibTeX
@article{Eilat2026,
author = {Eilat, Ran and Neeman, Zvika and Solan, Eilon},
title = {Opportunity Hunters: A Model of Competitive Sequential Inspections},
journal = {American Economic Journal: Microeconomics},
year = {2026},
volume = {18},
number = {2},
pages = {228--267},
doi = {10.1257/mic.20240245}
}
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