Strategic Evidence Disclosure in Networks and Equilibrium Discrimination
American Economic Journal: Microeconomics · 01.05.2026 · 18 (2) · 192-227
DOI: 10.1257/mic.20230285 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, erschienen am 01.05.2026. Verfasst von Leonie Baumann und 1 weiteren Autor:innen. Die Arbeit wurde bisher 1-mal zitiert (Crossref) und nennt 39 Literaturangaben.
Abstract (Originalsprache)
A group of agents with ex ante independent and identically uncertain quality compete for a prize, awarded by a principal. Agents may possess evidence about the quality of those they share a social connection with (neighbors), and themselves. In one equilibrium, adversarial disclosure of evidence leads the principal to statistically discriminate between agents based on their number of neighbors (degree). We identify parameter values for which an agent’s ex ante winning probability is monotone in degree. All equilibria that satisfy some robustness criteria lie between this adversarial disclosure equilibrium and a less informative one that features no snitching and no discrimination. (JEL D82, D83, D85, Z13)
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APA
Baumann, L., & Dutta, R. (2026). Strategic Evidence Disclosure in Networks and Equilibrium Discrimination. American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, 18(2), 192-227. https://doi.org/10.1257/mic.20230285
Vancouver
Baumann L, Dutta R. Strategic Evidence Disclosure in Networks and Equilibrium Discrimination. American Economic Journal: Microeconomics. 2026;18(2):192-227. doi:10.1257/mic.20230285
BibTeX
@article{Baumann2026,
author = {Baumann, Leonie and Dutta, Rohan},
title = {Strategic Evidence Disclosure in Networks and Equilibrium Discrimination},
journal = {American Economic Journal: Microeconomics},
year = {2026},
volume = {18},
number = {2},
pages = {192--227},
doi = {10.1257/mic.20230285}
}
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