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Welfare of Competitive Price Discrimination with Captive Consumers

Yanlin Chen, Xianwen Shi, Jun Zhang

American Economic Journal: Microeconomics · 01.08.2026 · 18 (3) · 203-243

DOI: 10.1257/mic.20230234 ↗

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Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, erschienen am 01.08.2026. Verfasst von Yanlin Chen und 2 weiteren Autor:innen. Die Arbeit nennt 33 Literaturangaben.

AbstractBibliografische AngabenZitierenVerwandte Studien

Abstract (Originalsprache)

We study the welfare effects of price discrimination in a duopoly with both captive and contested consumers. Using a unified information design approach, we characterize the best and worst market segmentations for producer surplus, consumer surplus, and social surplus. The firm-optimal segmentation, which divides the market into two nested segments, consistently reduces consumer welfare relative to uniform pricing. The consumer-optimal segmentation, which divides the market into a symmetric segment and a nested segment, may sometimes yield a Pareto improvement but does not necessarily coincide with the social-optimal segmentation. (JEL D43, D83)

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APA

Chen, Y., Shi, X., & Zhang, J. (2026). Welfare of Competitive Price Discrimination with Captive Consumers. American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, 18(3), 203-243. https://doi.org/10.1257/mic.20230234

Vancouver

Chen Y, Shi X, Zhang J. Welfare of Competitive Price Discrimination with Captive Consumers. American Economic Journal: Microeconomics. 2026;18(3):203-243. doi:10.1257/mic.20230234

BibTeX
@article{Chen2026,
  author = {Chen, Yanlin and Shi, Xianwen and Zhang, Jun},
  title = {Welfare of Competitive Price Discrimination with Captive Consumers},
  journal = {American Economic Journal: Microeconomics},
  year = {2026},
  volume = {18},
  number = {3},
  pages = {203--243},
  doi = {10.1257/mic.20230234}
}
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