Agency Pricing and Bargaining: Evidence from the E-Book Market
American Economic Journal: Microeconomics · 01.05.2026 · 18 (2) · 146-191
DOI: 10.1257/mic.20220232 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, erschienen am 01.05.2026. Verfasst von Babur De los Santos und 2 weiteren Autor:innen. Die Arbeit nennt 65 Literaturangaben.
Abstract (Originalsprache)
This paper studies the pricing implications of wholesale and agency contracts when input terms are determined through bargaining. We develop a structural Nash-in-Nash bargaining model and show that the distribution of bargaining power determines whether agency contracts raise or lower retail prices relative to wholesale contracts. We apply the model to the e-book market, which transitioned from wholesale to agency contracts after the expiration of a ban on agency contracting. Estimates indicate that the retailers have most of the bargaining power. Counterfactual simulations show that most-favored-nation clauses raise prices but would lower the profits of the publishers and Amazon. (JEL C78, D86, K21, L14, L42, L81, L82)
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APA
Santos, B. D. L., O’Brien, D. P., & Wildenbeest, M. R. (2026). Agency Pricing and Bargaining: Evidence from the E-Book Market. American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, 18(2), 146-191. https://doi.org/10.1257/mic.20220232
Vancouver
Santos BDL, O’Brien DP, Wildenbeest MR. Agency Pricing and Bargaining: Evidence from the E-Book Market. American Economic Journal: Microeconomics. 2026;18(2):146-191. doi:10.1257/mic.20220232
BibTeX
@article{Santos2026,
author = {Santos, Babur De los and O’Brien, Daniel P. and Wildenbeest, Matthijs R.},
title = {Agency Pricing and Bargaining: Evidence from the E-Book Market},
journal = {American Economic Journal: Microeconomics},
year = {2026},
volume = {18},
number = {2},
pages = {146--191},
doi = {10.1257/mic.20220232}
}
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