Monitor Reputation and Transparency
American Economic Journal: Microeconomics · 01.11.2023 · 15 (4) · 1-67
DOI: 10.1257/mic.20220006 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, erschienen am 01.11.2023. Verfasst von Iván Marinovic und 1 weiteren Autor:innen. Die Arbeit wurde bisher 4-mal zitiert (Crossref) und nennt 55 Literaturangaben.
Abstract (Originalsprache)
We study the disclosure policy of a regulator overseeing a monitor with reputation concerns. The monitor faces a manager, who chooses how much to manipulate based on the monitor’s reputation. Reputational incentives are strongest for intermediate reputations. Instead of providing transparency, the regulator’s disclosure policy aims to keep the monitor’s reputation intermediate, even at the cost of diminished incentives. Beneficial schemes feature random delay or noisy information. Schemes that feature verifiable disclosure destroy reputational incentives. The regulator discloses more aggressively when she has better enforcement tools. (JEL D82, D83, G21, G28, G38, M42)
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APA
Marinovic, I., & Szydlowski, M. (2023). Monitor Reputation and Transparency. American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, 15(4), 1-67. https://doi.org/10.1257/mic.20220006
Vancouver
Marinovic I, Szydlowski M. Monitor Reputation and Transparency. American Economic Journal: Microeconomics. 2023;15(4):1-67. doi:10.1257/mic.20220006
BibTeX
@article{Marinovic2023,
author = {Marinovic, Iván and Szydlowski, Martin},
title = {Monitor Reputation and Transparency},
journal = {American Economic Journal: Microeconomics},
year = {2023},
volume = {15},
number = {4},
pages = {1--67},
doi = {10.1257/mic.20220006}
}
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